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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the current climate in the 
activist shareholder space, with a primary focus on activist hedge funds aiming to 
financially benefit from their endeavors. It begins with a written timeline of the history of 
activist investing throughout the twentieth century and follows with a transition into the 
current climate. The current landscape of activist investing is then discussed, which 
includes both criticisms and compliments. This analysis of the current landscape includes 
a case study of eight well-known hedge funds, some of which operate as pure activist 
funds while others contain both active and passive positions, and the performance of their 
activist positions. The paper concludes with an analysis on potential measures that could 
be taken to limit the negative effects of shareholder activism while still retaining the 
positive effects that shareholder activism can provide. 
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The History of Activist Investing: 
The year is 1622 and the company is the Dutch East India Company, referred to in 
the native language as “Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie.” To set the background, 
one must understand the origin and makeup of the Dutch East India Company. The 
company was incorporated in 1602 as somewhat of a merger between several of the small 
shipping companies that traded with the East Indies to form a natural monopoly and grew 
to dominate global trade throughout the seventeenth century. The company eventually 
gave way to the English East India Company, which was incorporated two years earlier. 
One large difference in the two corporations was the structure of ownership. The Dutch 
East India Company’s share capital was set up to be permanent. That is, shares could be 
publicly traded, but the company would not issue more shares nor would they buy them 
back from shareholders (De Jongh, 2011, 63).  
Though the company’s shares were liquid, one major caveat in owning these 
shares was the lack of control, as the Dutch East India Company never held “participant” 
meetings, as they were referred to at the time, where owners could voice their opinions. 
Today, you might recognize this as a shareholder’s meeting, which is now required for all 
publicly traded companies. As one of the first multinational corporations, the company 
was of great interest to potential investors, who were called participants at the time. The 
stage was set for a battle when approximately 40% of the shareholders felt the directors 
had been abusing their power to further their own personal interests. With directors being 
elected for life, lacking personal liability and controlling a monopoly of information 
regarding the company, shareholders were left out in the cold with little way to combat 
the fraud being committed by management (De Jongh, 2011, 63-64). Still, management 
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stayed steadfast in its ways and would not give away the control it had been given, whose 
opinions were probably swayed due to the huge increases in wealth all of them had seen. 
In terms of shareholder control, it is understandable why the company was 
incorporated without any control rights. At the time, these shipping companies had a 
unique business model that we would find perplexing in this day and age. Before this 
multinational corporation was formed, investors had invested in the small precompanies, 
which is what they were referred to as at the time. These companies were often created 
for one single voyage. After the ship returned from the trip, the proceeds were divided 
among shareholders and the company was liquidated. After this, the participants in the 
last round of financing could choose whether or not they wanted to invest in the next 
company (De Jongh, 2011, 63). Also, it was assumed at the time that investors did not 
want to bother with the day-to-day operations and issues that came with operating these 
companies, but rather just wanted the large expected profit that came with it. In the 
transition from these many small precompanies to the large Dutch East India Company, 
the incorporators and management assumed the same rules would apply and investors 
would not care. Another reason the directors used to justify not giving control was that 
the investors had never had any part in the negotiations when the company was first 
formed (De Jongh, 2011, 65). In the mind of the directors, these investors were exactly 
the same as the investors in the precompanies. They had no reason to have any input on 
operations and were merely a source of capital for the company. The disconnect between 
both parties arose in the fact that these investors had a long-term time horizon. This was 
not originally thought to be the case upon the chartering of the Dutch East India 
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Company, but once the business evolved, directors removed the liquidation plans that 
were set to take place in 1623 (De Jongh, 2011, 65).   
When the company was incorporated, there was a Charter formed where it was 
stated that investors had the choice to withdraw their money after 10-year and 21-year 
financial statements were released. After the company struggled early on in its inception 
due to a need for long-term investments, the company stated that it would no longer be 
releasing a 10-year statement, and rather would merge the two and just provide a 21-year 
financial statement (De Jongh, 2011, 67). Investors had no idea what the status of the 
company’s financials were and were unable to withdraw their money in 1612, which 
started to raise some mutterings. The company justified its decision by pointing out that 
since shares were so common, investors could get their money back immediately by 
selling shares on the open market and so there would be no negative effects (Gelderblom 
& Jonker, 2004, 656). When the Dutch East India Company announced that it would no 
longer be conducting an audit on its 21-year results, participants in the company felt it 
was time to act. Unlike earlier talks, these participants were not aiming to withdraw their 
money and shut the company down, but rather end the internal abuse and imbalance of 
power in the company’s ownership and management (De Jongh, 2011, 68). 
The participants sent pamphlets out to the public, detailing what exactly had 
occurred. They broke it down into three main issues: there was no audit conducted, 
directors were lining their own pockets without any oversight, and investors had no 
control rights. To the modern investor, these all seem like logical requests to be dealt 
with, though at the time they met resistance. Even at the time, other companies were 
much friendlier to shareholders. The English East India Company (EIC) had an annual 
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meeting where financial information was released and investors were able to appoint their 
board of directors as well as decide their annual salaries (De Jongh, 2011, 74).  The 
participants in the Dutch East India Company looked to the EIC for guidance in 
structuring their demands. Still, the situation was complicated as the Dutch East India 
Company was a semipublic company, meaning that it needed to adhere to the public 
interests of the Netherlands. This gave directors somewhat of an explanation for why 
profitability had been low during the period, which was partially due to the battles 
between the company’s ships and Portuguese and Spanish ships. Directors offered other 
explanations, such as the complexity of preparing an audit with so many ships in a fleet, 
though none of the explanations satisfied the participants (De Jongh, 2011, 77). The real 
issue was the connection of the directors to the government. This made it hard to upend 
the system, as many of the directors were the ones making the decisions. Eventually, the 
provinces without direct ties to the directors of the Dutch East India Company were able 
to convince the States General, the governing body, that the Charter needed to be 
amended, which they did (De Jongh, 2011, 78). 
After this compromise between directors and shareholders, the shareholders still 
did not have many of their needs met or directors simply did not comply. For example, 
directors still did not release financial statements and continued to trade the shares of the 
company on insider information. Some shareholders were still upset, but those that kept 
faith in the company were duly rewarded, as the Dutch East India Company transformed 
into a monopoly and investors received ample dividends and a large appreciation in share 
prices (De Jongh, 2011, 81-82). The important fact to come out of this story is essentially 
the advent of shareholder activism. While nothing extremely productive came out of their 
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demands, the participants established a right to question management and engage in 
discussion regarding the best course of action for the given company, something that has 
transformed an incredible amount to where it is today: shareholder activism. 
Activist investing can be defined as a style of investing in which the investor 
assertively tries to impact the business underlying the investment. These investors do so 
by influencing board members, senior executives and other large investors, either through 
a public or private forum (Lin, 2015, 472). One distinction that can be drawn between 
these investors and the shareholders of the Dutch East India Company is the necessity 
facing both parties. In the case of the Dutch East India Company, a reaction was both 
justified and needed by the shareholders in the company, as without action they would 
have been left with nothing. The modern-day activist investor has much different 
objectives, which often are seen to be self-motivated rather than for the good of the 
company. For this reason, many experts believe activist investing is currently harming the 
economy. Still, there are people that firmly believe activist investors have a positive 
impact on companies (Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, 2013). In order to realize how we got to 
the current culture of activist investing, we must study the gradual shift in activist 
investing and where it currently stands.   
While the root of activist investing came about in the Dutch East India Company, 
there have been various campaigns since. Many argue that the true origins did not arise 
until the legendary investor Ben Graham took up the cause in the 1920’s. Before this 
case, shareholders were inclined to speak up only if the company was being clearly 
mismanaged. This case was the first documented case of an investor recognizing an 
opportunity and brought it to management, only to be rebuffed and follow up by creating 
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a proxy vote among shareholders. Northern Pipeline came about after the United States 
government recognized Standard Oil as a monopoly and forced a breakup of the 
company. Graham was astute enough to recognize that the liquid assets the company 
owned, which were unrelated to their actual business, were worth around $95 a share 
while their stock was only trading at $60 a share (Carlen, 2013). Because of this, Graham 
slowly built his ownership share to around 5% and requested the company distribute $90 
per share by selling off these assets, but it refused. Finally, one year after initially trying, 
Graham was able to get enough shareholder support to garner a $70 per share distribution 
using the extra liquid assets (Carlen, 2013). One of the investors was a man by the name 
of John Rockefeller, who was the founder of Standard Oil and an extremely wealthy man 
(the wealthiest in the history of the United States when adjusted for inflation). He was so 
impressed that he extended this thought to many of the other companies that had been 
products of the Standard Oil divesture, and ended up making a lot more money in the 
process (Carlen, 2013). This quote in 1932 by Ben Graham says it all, and really set the 
stage for future investors to become active: “[Shareholders] have forgotten also that they 
are owners of a business and not merely owners of a quotation on the stock ticket” 
(Carlen, 2013). 
Benjamin Graham was certainly a legendary investor, though he was not known 
for his activist endeavors, as to him, activism was more of a supplementary tool to be 
used in extreme cases. Slowly but surely, however, bright minds began to discover that 
shareholder activism could help them make a quick return on a position. These 
campaigns, referred to as “offensive” shareholder activism by John Armour and Brian 
Cheffins, imply that company management does not see a need to change but the activists 
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that come in believe they can unlock value in the shares, much like Ben Graham did. The 
authors define this type of activism as an investor (this could be an individual or 
corporation) without a large stake in a company choosing to buy shares “with the 
intention to agitate for changes to correct failures by management to maximize 
shareholder returns” (Armour and Cheffins, 2011, 256). The scope of this paper is more 
geared towards this type of activism, which is in contrast to a large group of shareholders 
such as the owners of the Dutch East India Company coming together and spreading the 
word among one another to form a cohesive group. As can be seen in Figure 1, both 
“offensive” activism and general proxy challenge activism increased dramatically from 
the early 20th century up through the 1940’s. During the entire time period there were 61 
incidents of “offensive” activism, an average of 1.22 per year, though the authors 
acknowledge that a few campaigns could be missing from this dataset, as offensive 
activism does not always result in a proxy battle (Armour and Cheffins, 2011, 256). 
Figure 1: 
Source: Armour and Cheffins, 2011, 256 
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Of the 61 incidents, 60.6% were raised by individuals, 11.5% were raised by nonfinancial 
corporations, and the remaining 27.9% were raised by financial corporations. Only 11.5% 
were campaigns raised by a collective investment vehicle (a subset of financial 
corporations), the equivalent of today’s hedge funds. This is in contrast to more modern 
figures, where from 2007 to 2008, 50% of the 102 offensive campaigns were brought 
about by hedge funds (Armour and Cheffins, 2011, 256-259). 
Shareholder activism has steadily risen since these years for a variety of reasons. 
One reason is the increased access to information, especially information that is credible. 
The first regulation of public companies to disclose information was the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 881). This explanation seems like a possibly justification 
for the large increases of proxy challenges during the 1930’s and 1940’s. Lower trading 
costs are another potential explanation for the increase in activism over the years. Prior to 
1968, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) member firms provided fixed minimum broker 
commissions that led to much higher fees than investors are used to today. Slowly, over 
the period 1968 to 1975, the fixed commission structure was eliminated to reduce trading 
costs (Stout, 1995, 634). This decreased cost of trading meant that potential offensive 
activist investors could generate a larger return, especially given the fact that these 
investors had to buy massive quantities of shares in order to initiate a position in which 
they could force management to change its strategy.  
One potential activist strategy that is and was commonly used by investors is the 
takeover of a company. The use has evolved over time, though it generally did not begin 
in the open market until the 20th century. Armour and Cheffins studied instances in which 
a group or individual made an attempt to buy up a large quantity of shares in order to 
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attain majority control of the company without the approval of the target company’s 
board and found 82 instances of an attempted takeover, an average of 1.64 attempts per 
year (Armour and Cheffins, 2011, 269). Until 1950, takeover attempts and offensive 
shareholder activism seemed to be inversely related during most decades; that is, in 
periods when takeover attempts were prominent, shareholder activism was less prominent 
(with the exception of 1910-1919, when both levels were low). This would make logical 
sense, as both strategies are an attempt to gain control over assets that are believed to be 
underperforming or being mismanaged. When combined, takeover attempts and offensive 
shareholder activism occurred at an average of just under 3 times per year, about 0.8% of 
2015 levels (WSJ-FactSet Activism Scorecard, 2016). 
As the decades progressed, more and more investors began to recognize how 
underutilized these tactics were, and how many opportunities there were to increase 
productivity. During the 1960s and 1970s, however, individuals still made up a majority 
of shareholders, and due to the legislation of the SEC this made it difficult to have 
concrete influence (Jackson, 2010, 11). Shareholder proposals were growing, but most 
had little influence and hostile takeovers were few and far between due to the large 
individual investor presence in the market. Independent directors, that is directors who do 
not have a monetary link, were not required by the NYSE until 1977 (Jackson, 2010, 12). 
Managers at this time had little incentive to focus on long-term value creation. In 1980, 
only 20% of CEO compensation was tied to stock market performance. Another 
damaging trend at the time was the increase of conglomerates. Companies at the time 
believed scale was the key to increasing operating efficiency and also felt they would be 
diversified in the case of certain sector downturns (Jackson, 2010, 12). This often had the 
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effect of creating excess capacity and underperforming assets. At the start of the 1980s, 
the economy began to slow and the period of stagflation began, resulting in a relatively 
flat stock market combined with high interest rates (Jackson, 2010, 13). All of these 
trends came together to create a market ripe for corporate takeovers during the start of the 
1980s, which is known as the heyday of the corporate raider (Kosnik & Walsh, 1993).  
As the figure above illustrates, there was a large uptick in acquisition activity 
during the 1980s and extending into the 1990s. In the 1980s, between 20% and 40% of 
offers were contested depending on the year, while in the 1990s contested offers made up 
15% or less of all tendered offers. Many of the acquisitions at this time were completed 
using a large amount of debt, which is referred to as a leveraged buyout (LBO) 
(Holmstrom & Kaplan, 2001, 124). Investors who profited from this aggressive and risky 
form of purchasing a company can thank Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham, who first 
developed the public offering of “junk bonds.” These bonds were used as a method for 
Acquisition Volume as a % of Average Total Stock Market Capitalization 
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combating high inflation and low market returns and gave shell companies a way to raise 
enough capital to acquire underperforming companies (Jackson, 2010, 14). Pension funds 
would often invest in this debt, as the groups had a certain rate of return that they needed 
to meet in order to support future retirees. With the stock market remaining somewhat 
flat and the required returns of pension funds not changing, the funds often turned to this 
form of high-yield debt to meet obligations (Icahn, 1989). 
In the 1980s, almost half of all publicly traded major U.S. companies received 
hostile takeover bids, meaning target management never approved the bid (Holmstrom & 
Kaplan, 2001, 121). Companies tried to plan for a way to resist these offers, and 
eventually were given a potential defense in the advent of what is commonly referred to 
as a “poison pill,” though more formally called a shareholder rights plan. The defense 
was invented by Martin Lipton in 1982 (Brown, 2002). These plans essentially had the 
effect of diluting the overall share count, generally through allowing shareholders to buy 
current stock at a discount when an acquirer hits a certain ownership threshold. This 
action creates a disincentive for the potential acquirer, as their would-be ownership is cut 
almost in half, though this poison pill must be chosen to be activated by the board of 
directors (Brown, 2002). That is, if the board feels the takeover offer is beneficial for 
shareholders, they would not exercise the option. 
Over 400 US public companies adopted a shareholder rights plan from 1985 until 
1990 (Meyer & Strong, 1990, 73). Advocates of this defense claim that it is a method of 
limiting offers that are one-sided to certain shareholders (such as partial tender offers) 
and forces bidders to negotiate with the board in order to find other means of creating 
long-term value. Opponents claim that the takeover defense is an obvious choice for 
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complacent board members who want to remain in control and that shareholders have no 
say in whether these poison pills are enacted or not (Meyer & Strong, 1990, 73). In a 
study of the success of different takeover defenses from 1991 to 2005, it was found that 
the likelihood of a successful bid dropped from approximately 50% down to just 33% 
when the poison pill was present. It was also found that the poison pill did in fact 
generally lead to further negotiations and eventually improved the price of a bid in some 
cases (Jackson, 2010, 17). The efficacy of shareholder rights plans is still under debate 
today, but at the time it was a sign of how much the takeover market was growing and 
how many companies saw it as a major threat. 
Even though these takeover attempts were often contested, empirical evidence 
suggests that as a whole, the takeovers in the 1980s had a positive net effect on 
businesses. This was primarily due to the reasons listed above that fostered a market 
prime for takeovers (Holmstrom & Kaplan, 2001, 127). Complacent and inefficient 
management was prominent, and was an easy enough target for corporate raiders of the 
time. Carl Icahn and T. Boone Pickens, two prominent corporate raiders at the time, were 
often were subject to criticism that they were putting people out of work. Icahn’s 
response to this criticism was, “the difference is that I and other ‘raiders’ usually 
eliminate people who are most responsible for the mess – the ‘Top Brass’” (Icahn, 1989). 
In the same article, Icahn seems to foreshadow the future, or perhaps himself induced the 
change, claiming it would be more beneficial for pension funds to invest directly in the 
takeovers rather than have them finance the acquisitions through debt, as they were 
simply missing out on a great deal of return and taking on excess and unnecessary debt 
(Icahn, 1989). 
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Even prior to Carl Icahn’s announcement, however, the landscape was shifting 
from individual corporate raiders who had set up shell corporations to raise capital and 
commit takeovers towards institutional investors who were beginning to notice the 
potential returns they were missing out on. The establishment of the Council of 
Institutional Investors, led by California’s treasurer at the time, Jesse Unruh, is often seen 
as the beginning of institutional investor activism (Gillan & Starks, 2007, 8). At the time, 
Unruh was in charge of both the California Public Employees Retirement System and the 
California State Teachers Retirement System, more commonly known as CalPERS and 
CalSTRS, respectively. Texaco was a large investment for both funds, and while they 
held the stock the Bass Brothers, prominent corporate raiders of the time, acquired 9.8% 
of Texaco’s outstanding shares before selling them back at a $137 million market 
premium (Gillan & Starks, 2007, 8). After Texaco did not provide the same offer to either 
pension fund, Unruh felt the need to create the Council of Institutional Investors to ensure 
these institutional shareholders had the same rights as other shareholders. While the 
initial style of activism among these funds was similar to that of traditional activists, 
which was to simply submit shareholder proxy proposals, the style evolved. Pension 
funds began engaging in dialogue with target companies, and only after that used media 
and additional outlets to make other investors aware of the firm’s issues and the fund’s 
proposals (Gillan & Starks, 2007, 9).  
As the 1990s approached, the number of institutional investors continued to grow 
due to an increased presence of union funds and a large growth in mutual funds. The 
ownership of shares by mutual funds grew from 5% in 1985 to just over 12% in 1995 
(Jackson, 2010, 16). As can be seen in Figure 3, this increase was not exclusive to mutual 
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funds. During the late 1990s into the early 2000s, institutions began to control a larger 
and larger percentage of shares, giving them more power to dispute management. Over 
time, CEOs and CFOs began to communicate with major shareholders and money  
Figure 3: 
managers, which had not been the case just fifteen years prior (Gillan & Starks, 2007, 
11). This era also marked a staunch increase in merger and acquisition (M&A) activity. 
From 1991 to 1997, M&A was 5.4% of GDP and moved up to 10.8% of GDP from 1998 
to 2005. This was partially driven by the technology industry, but very few of the 
mergers and acquisitions involved hostile bids, a stark contrast with the 1980s (Jackson, 
2010, 17). Another important development of this time was the large increase in stock as 
a percentage of CEO compensation among New Economy firms, growing from 33% in 
1992 and going up to 83% in 2000. These were the firms focused on technology and high 
growth, which could be seen as an indicator for the shift in market trends at the time. This 
strategy of compensation took off when the SEC eventually changed the law in order to 
allow executives to exercise stock options and sell the stock at the same time (Jackson, 
2010, 19). This also led executives to start focusing on short-term time windows, since 
Source: Gillan & Starks, 2007, 48 
% Ownership of Institutional Investors in U.S. Stock Markets 
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their compensation was so heavily linked to it. As these managers focused more and 
more on the short-term, institutional investors began to see the effects. Investors took a 
liking to stocks that had momentum and wanted immediate returns, so they would 
gravitate towards funds that could offer this. This wave of new culture has only 
perpetuated the current activist climate 
 This shift into shorter-term investment time horizons has been a product of 
multiple factors. As mentioned above, the compensation structures and quick returns 
investors saw in the late 1990s made them hungry for more. In addition to this, the shift 
towards the technology sector shortened the time horizon. Often, investors like to quickly 
cash in on one investment before going out and looking for the next big innovation in the 
field. As of 2014, the technology sector had the shortest holding period by investment 
managers of any of the twenty Morningstar equity categories by a wide margin. Also, 
according to the CFA Institute, 43% of investment managers have more than 50% of their 
compensation based on yearly performance and 79% have less than 50% based on 
longer-term performance measures (Almeida, Boyd, Flaherty & Roberge, 2015, 3). 
Potentially because of this, the average holding period for stocks has decreased from 
above 5 years in 1989 to just 1.92 years as of December 2014 (Almeida et al., 2015, 2). 
This shift towards a technology-oriented world is evident in the fact that, according to 
Bloomberg LP (2016), technology stocks currently make up over 20% of the S&P 500, 
and have more than a 5% advantage over the next largest sector. Investors have trended 
more and more towards focusing on the short-term investment time horizon, and activist 
investors have had no choice but to follow the trend in order to continue to attract clients.  
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Current Landscape: 
Activist investing has come under some scrutiny in recent years, as more and 
more money managers look for ways to break out of the mold and offer superior returns 
to their investors. There are a large variety of strategies, some as short-term as a matter of 
microseconds and some as long-term as the Warren Buffett strategy of wanting to hold an 
investment until the end of time. The center of the debate regarding shareholder activism 
in the present day is whether the managers are more concerned about taking an active 
role and flipping their stake for a quick profit, or if managers are initiating the activism in 
order to unlock long-term value for shareholders. When one looks at the data regarding 
activist campaign activity over the last six years, it is clear to see activity has exploded. 
Back in 2010, there were 219 activist campaigns compared to 374 in 2015, which 
represents an 11.3% compound annual growth rate (WSJ-FactSet Activism Scorecard).  
Figure 4: 
Source: WSJ-FactSet Activism Scorecard 
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As of 2015, there were roughly 70 activist hedge funds, according to HFR Inc., 
and these hedge funds saw their assets almost double from the first quarter of 2013 to 
2015, which is certainly part of the reason for the increase in campaigns, as these funds 
need a way to effectively deploy the new capital (Hoffman, 2015). While the trend should 
not be considered indicative of future growth, the very recent injection of capital has 
many of the hedge funds chasing returns in order to justify their excessive fees in which 
they take a percentage of both assets under management as well as a large percentage of 
the fund’s performance. These fees are most commonly cited at 2/20, meaning the 
manager would take 2% of assets under management and 20% of the gains achieved 
above an agreed-upon rate (Hedge Fund Fees, 2016). This large surge in activity has left 
some activists partaking in strategies that many view as economically harmful. 
The topic of shareholder activism has come up during the current presidential 
election, with Hillary Clinton addressing the issue and attempting to reduce what she 
refers to as “hit-and-run” activists and the philosophy of “quarterly capitalism” (Benoit, 
2015). Often, these shareholders come in and pressure the board of directors to 
immediately return cash to shareholders through the use of buybacks, dividends and 
corporate breakups. The tradeoff companies commonly face is between returning this 
cash to shareholders and reinvesting in themselves, either through research and 
development, creating new plants and equipment or other forms of capital expenditures. 
Fortune 500 companies targeted by activists have increased their percentage of cash flow 
spent on share buybacks and dividends up to 37% in the first year after being approached 
compared to 22% in the year before. The same companies reduced capital expenditures in 
the five years following the beginning of an activist campaign (Benoit et al., 2015). Some 
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speculate that firms have begun to shift their expenditures in this manner even before 
activists take aim at the company in order to keep their shareholders content in the short 
run. The data supports this hypothesis, as Fortune 500 companies have increased 
buybacks and dividends as a percentage of operating cash flows, up to 36% in 2013, 
compared to 18% in 2003. They have also decreased spending on plants and equipment 
from 33% of operating cash flow down to only 29% over the same time period (Benoit et 
al., 2015).  
Figure 5: 
Still, not everyone sees reduction in capital as a negative. Some proponents of 
hedge funds contend that this reduction in capital expenditures signifies a more efficient 
use of capital. Activists see themselves as an unknown for the boards and management. 
By advocating for increased leverage to lower the cost of capital and spinning or selling 
off underperforming assets or divisions, which can generate capital that can be returned 
to shareholders, they believe they have the long-term shareholders’ best interests in mind, 
Source: Benoit et al., 2015 
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even if they are just after a quick profit (Allaire, 2015). Still, investment is necessary for 
growth, and according to Michael Feroli, the chief U.S. economist at J.P. Morgan Chase 
& Co., capital spending by businesses makes up around one-eighth of spending in the 
U.S. economy and has been a crucial driver of long-term growth (Benoit et al., 2015). 
Steven Fazzari, an economist at Washington University, makes the point that much of the 
capital returned to shareholders that would have otherwise been reinvested ends up in the 
bank accounts of the wealthy, who tend to be the majority of shareholders and have a 
propensity to save more of their income (Benoit et al., 2015). According to Gary Lutin, 
Chairman of The Shareholder Forum, which is a website dedicated to the long-term 
interests of investors, the financial engineering that is commonly used can have 
disastrous effects by decreasing the company’s ability to adapt to issues or take 
advantage of opportunities. The financial engineering increases the risk of a company 
while also decreasing access to capital (G. Lutin, personal communication, October 14, 
2015).  
One such example is the case of Wet Seal Inc., a teen-fashion retailer that was the 
target of the activist hedge fund Clinton Group Inc. back in 2012. Clinton managed to get 
four representatives on the board of directors, after which the company cut jobs and 
repurchased $25 million of stock even while the company had a negative free cash flow 
of $46.5 million in the prior year, according to Bloomberg LP (Benoit et al., 2015). Just 
this year, Wet Seal shut down two-thirds of its stores and filed for bankruptcy protection, 
which the company blamed on an overall decline in the market along with other strategic 
mistakes. Jeff Van Sinderen, an analyst at B. Riley & Co., said that while this may be 
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true, the company would have had a lot more flexibility and noted how during tough 
times, $25 million can have a great effect (Benoit et al., 2015).  
Another common argument by proponents of shareholder activism is that board 
members and management can become complacent. These companies are used to 
operating a specific way and with a certain culture; they have certain strategies and as the 
saying goes, old habits die hard. Often, these managers do not even think to make certain 
changes to their management style (Allaire, 2015). This argument certainly has some 
merit to it, as often an outside pair of eyes can be most effective in identifying flaws in 
capital allocation that the company had never considered. One potential counterargument 
to this point is the use of the consulting industry. According to Gavan Blau (2015), the 
management consulting business in the United States alone brings in over $200 billion in 
revenue, with 20.3% of this coming from corporate strategy and 36.9% coming from 
process and operations management. While these are broad sectors and not entirely 
directed at what activists are aiming to do, these companies are still spending quite a bit 
to get someone with an outside perspective who knows the industry to look at their 
company and give a thorough analysis of how to improve long-term returns. Another 
counterargument company management could potentially offer would be that they have a 
better understanding of both the competitive landscape in their industry and what the 
future outlook is for the company. Sometimes, companies are reluctant to disclose future 
strategy or intentionally release guidance that is not actually in their long term plans. This 
is a common tool used in the economic field of game theory, as the idea is to lead other 
firms in your industry to believe they should take a certain action first. 
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One final common endorsement is the fact that these shareholders are, in fact, the 
owners of the company and should have some control over what happens (Allaire, 2015). 
This is very valid argument, and can often be justified. One issue with this statement, 
however, is that these activist hedge funds often only take a stake of 5-10%, which is 
nowhere near a majority ownership. There have even been instances of investors gaining 
some control by initiating a position of less than 1%, which was the case when 
ValueAct’s Jeffery Ubben managed to land his fund a seat on the board of Microsoft and, 
some have speculated, helped to remove Steve Ballmer as Chief Executive Officer 
(Ovide, 2013). These funds have quite a bit of clout, so when individual investors or even 
other institutions hear them give opinions to boards, they often simply assume they are 
correct. This can be seen in the fact that the stocks of activist targets from 2009 to 2014 
increased above the market rate at a median of 2.1% the day after and 3.2% one month 
after the announcement (Corporate, 2015). This would imply investors see an activist 
campaign as a boost to shareholder value and often trust the opinion of activists. 
Figure 6: 
Source: Corporate Finance Advisory and Mergers & Acquisitions, 2015 
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It is important to note that all three of these arguments have merit and should not 
be ignored. There are certainly cases in which companies would benefit from an activist 
coming in and explaining what could be done more efficiently. Often, activists will come 
in passively and make suggestions to management that are logical, and management 
responds by either giving them a board seat and assisting them in carrying out their 
agenda, or simply adhering to the advice without getting the fund involved on the board. 
The crucial issue that can arise is the differing time horizons between company 
management and the activist hedge funds that make the campaigns. 
The goal of these activists is simple; they aim to attract more client money. Using 
the standard fee schedule mentioned above, if these activists can bring on another high 
net worth client who is willing to invest $50 million, they have just made themselves $1 
million, and this amount can only increase based on performance. The activist hedge 
funds that operate in today’s environment are constantly feeling pressure to attract new 
investors and retain current investors due to the incredible amount of players in the 
market. These activists know what their clients want, which is simply to make money. 
Gary Lutin believes this can have a negative effect on how activists deal with companies. 
These funds release quarterly results and every wealthy investor who is looking to invest 
will be looking at these figures before choosing a fund to invest in. For this reason, the 
activists have to take a quarterly focus on returns lest they run the risk of losing potential 
clients (G. Lutin, personal communication, October 14, 2015). Chief Justice Strine of the 
Delaware Supreme Court reiterates this point, saying “there is a danger that activist 
stockholders will make proposals motivated by interests other than maximizing the long-
term, sustainable profitability of the corporation” (Strine, 2011).  
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The General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (DGCL) is often looked to 
as a guideline for corporate law all around the country due to the fact that over 50% of 
publicly-traded companies and 64% of Fortune 500 companies are incorporated there 
(State, 2016). Under the legislation of the DGCL, capital that the corporation receives 
from investors (which would include any purchase of the company’s stock, even if it 
were done in the secondary market) is permanent capital. Because of this, directors have 
a fiduciary duty to maximize the overall value of the corporation in order to best benefit 
the investors who hold the company’s stock (Laster & Zeberkiewicz, 2015). J. Travis 
Laster, a Vice Chancellor of Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, explains where 
a conflict can arise. The activists who take seats on the board of companies must act in 
the best interests of both the corporation and the investor, so it is clear how they face a 
conflict of interest. In one case, the activist must manage in order to optimize the 
perpetual capital, while in the other, the activist must manage for an exit (Laster & 
Zeberkiewicz, 2015).  
For this reason, these activist investors must create the appearance of maintaining 
a long-term focus in order to bypass legal hurdles and convince the company’s board of 
directors that they have the long-term interests of the company in mind. Often, a case can 
be made for why it would be beneficial, and it is more a matter of opinion among board 
members. This plays to the advantage of activists, but it is not only these hedge fund 
managers who are pushing for a shorter-term time horizon. 
According to Morgan Stanley, as of 2014 the average institutional ownership 
among S&P 500 companies was 83% and was expected to increase at a rate of 0.8% per 
year as more and more investors switch into mutual funds (Hughes, 2014). The 
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significance of this is that these mutual funds have the same struggle as the activists do. 
They must show good quarterly returns and are not as focused on the long-term health of 
the company, so the pressure trickles down to the executives at the company. With such a 
large ownership percentage, what the institutions say has a large effect on how the board 
governs the company. The market is trending towards a shorter-term focus, which can 
have devastating effects. 
Another aspect of activist hedge funds that can create a negative effect is the fact 
that many of them engage companies for the wrong reason. These activists understand 
that advertising is a major part of any company, and their investment firms are no 
exception. The more people hear about them, the more likely they are to attract new 
investors. Because of this, with every activist campaign they engage in, the funds want to 
make noise. What is meant by this is making it into the press consistently, which can be 
done a variety of ways: getting a seat on the board, writing publicly available letters to 
the board or even speaking directly to the board (G. Lutin, personal communication, 
October 14, 2015).  
One less conventional example of this was the use of colorful language by activist 
investor Bob Chapman. In a 13D filing, Chapman cited his interaction with the Chief 
Financial Officer of the company he was targeting, explaining the executive’s reaction 
when Chapman criticized his reputation among other investors. This filing, according to 
John Carney of DealBreaker, was the first time an SEC filing contained the four-letter 
obscenity starting with “f” followed by “you” (Carney, 2007). This story garnered 
enough attention to alert the press, which may have been the true motive of Chapman. In 
his mind, potential investors would see him as brash and abrasive, which is often what is 
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needed as an activist investor. This focus on making the press could lead normally 
passive investors to feel forced to take aggressive measures in order to keep their brand 
name fresh in the mind of potential investors. While there is no empirical evidence to 
back this claim up, common sense would lead one to believe that in the hypercompetitive 
landscape of hedge funds, no stone is left unturned and any advantage that can be had 
will be had by someone. Once these unnecessary activist campaigns are taken up, hedge 
fund managers will have no choice but to try to extract all possible value from the 
position before dumping it.  
Some scholars have run tests attempting to discover the success of activist hedge 
funds. One example is the research done by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav and Wei Jiang, 
who studied the five year returns of companies that were targeted by activist hedge funds. 
In their research, the three found that the effects of approximately 2,000 interventions 
were followed by improved operating performance during the five years following 
(Bebchuk et al., 2013). There are a few aspects of this study that must be addressed, 
given that we are assessing the current market for shareholder activism.  
One potential issue with this study is the characterization of “long-term,” which 
was defined in the study as five years. While it is often said that three years or more is 
considered long-term, many would disagree with this classification. In his 1988 letter to 
shareholders, Warren Buffett, often considered one of the most (if not the most) 
successful investors of the modern era says “We expect to hold…securities for a long 
time. In fact, when we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding 
managements, our favorite holding period is forever” (Buffett, 1988). One would think 
that the goal of most investors would be would be emulate Buffett and his superior 
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returns, which implies an indefinite holding period. Once a study is done that tracks the 
10, 30 or even 100-year performance of the securities subjected to shareholder activism, 
then a more concrete conclusion can be reached. As of now, however, the evidence 
remains equivocal. 
Another issue that must be addressed is that the nature of activist hedge funds has 
changed. At 2,000 interventions over a 14 year period, the average number of campaigns 
launched per year was just under 143, which is only 40% of the current level of activist 
campaigns of 357. In economics, there is a law called diminishing marginal returns, 
which when applied to this industry may imply that the more people enter the space, the 
less return there is to be had. As more and more activist hedge funds form, newcomers 
may end up suffering from being late to the party, chasing returns that are no longer 
available as more and more companies are put under the microscope of activists. The 
entire landscape is much different than it was during the period that was previously 
studied.  
As mentioned before, it is critical to remember that not all activist campaigns are 
rooted in improper motives. Many activist campaigns are taken up in order to unlock the 
long-term value of shares of a company and are done for the right reason. The company 
really is being mismanaged or is neglecting potentially profitable assets or strategies, and 
an investor who has experience in doing so can amend the issue. The problem, as 
mentioned before, is the more players that enter the field, the quicker the opportunities 
dry up. Also, as more capital floods into activist hedge funds, the funds must justify the 
high rates, and so they must go out and chase returns. Many of these funds are the smaller 
funds attempting to attract investors, but some believe the tendency is beginning to 
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infiltrate the larger hedge funds. Next, we will take a look at some of the larger activist 
hedge funds that are well-known in the United States and how they are currently faring in 
this environment. 
Case Study of Activist Hedge Funds: 
 The best way to study the current landscape of activist investing is to look at the 
current positions held by activist hedge funds. The study looks at a list of eight of the 
largest activist hedge funds in the United States that use a primarily domestic approach. 
Some of these funds use an almost-exclusively activist approach, such as ValueAct 
Capital Management, Trian Fund Management, Pershing Square Capital Management 
and Icahn Associates Corporation, while others use a blended approach and use activism 
when necessary. In order to control for that, only current positions in which activism was 
used (or currently is being used) were used in the study. Other studies, such as the one 
conducted by Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang that was referenced above, have looked at the 
effectiveness of past campaigns, but no studies have been done on the landscape as of the 
end of 2015. What this study attempts to do is look at what these hedge funds are 
currently holding and how these positions have fared since the position was initiated. 
This can hopefully give readers an idea of the effects of current shareholder activism.  
The idea of this is that if these activist managers truly believed they were 
unlocking long-term value in shares, they would be hesitant to sell positions in these 
stocks. While the case can be made for opportunity cost, one can negate this by pointing 
out the large increase in capital flowing into the funds. There is a lot of new capital to 
invest. Every position held by these activist funds and its performance over the given 
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fund’s holding period can be found in the appendix. The case studies will focus on one of 
most notable positions of each fund and the overall performance of the fund. 
There are a few important things to note on this study. It is important to note that 
some potential activist positions may be omitted, but given that results were aggregated 
and 70 positions were analyzed, the net effect would most likely be negligible. Another 
important note is at what point the position’s return is compared to its sector. The start of 
the quarter from which it was compared is the same row in which the sector return is 
listed, and is measured from the time a large stake is initiated, which has been bolded in 
the “Change” column. This return has been compared to the current share price compared 
to the cost basis of shares for the fund. One final important thing to note is that weighted 
average returns are not weighted to consider the holding period of investments, so an 
investment with a large annualized return that has only been held for one quarter has the 
same impact as one that has been held for years. This may have an effect on end results, 
but all positions and their holding periods are listed in the appendix. Also, positions 
weights were determined by current value, so negative returns have a lesser effect. 
 Finally, some data or positions may be missing from portfolios that were tracked, 
as hedge funds are not explicitly required to disclose all positions, which could affect 
overall performance numbers. All data was compiled using Bloomberg LP and the 
positions listed were disclosed as of December 31, 2015. An exception to this date is a 
handful of activist positions that were recently disclosed. The performance of activist 
positions compared to their sectors and the five-year performance of the funds compared 
to the S&P 500 index are both as of March 31, 2016. The table of activist hedge funds 
that are the subject of this case study are shown in on the following page. 
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Figure 7: 
 
Corvex Management: 
 Corvex Management is one of the newer activist hedge funds given its size of 
$6.3 billion. The fund was founded in January 2012 by Keith Meister, who was a 
protégée of Carl Icahn (Patton, 2015). The fund currently holds five positions in which 
the group took an activist role, which can all be seen in Appendix A. As can been seen in 
Appendix B, of the current positions held, three are outperforming the market in their 
given sector while two are underperforming. While this looks positive, the 
underperformers make up a larger weight of the portfolio and have a larger loss, which 
leads to a weighted average excess return of -3.8% in current position. The entire fund 
has underperformed the S&P 500 by a large amount when looking at one, three and four 
year annualized returns. Since its inception approximately four years ago, Corvex has 
trailed the market by about 2.5% on an annual basis. 
The most prominent and well-known position is in YUM! Brands Inc., a fast food 
conglomerate with brands such as Pizza Hut, KFC and Taco Bell. The activist position 
was initiated in quarter one of 2015 and has a cost basis of $84.38. As of the start of 
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quarter 2 of 2016, Yum had an annualized return of -11.7% while the consumer 
discretionary sector had grown by an annual rate of 5.0%. In October of 2015, Meister 
was named as a director with plans to spin off the brand’s Chinese division, claiming it 
could generate an extra $16 per share for Yum. In Meister’s opinion, the Chinese market 
is too focused on company-owned restaurants, which make up more than 75% of all Yum 
restaurants in China. This compares to 21% company ownership globally (Patton, 2015). 
Just five days after this story broke on October 15, Yum announced it would be splitting 
off its China business. With the spinoff, Yum China will become a separately traded 
entity by the end of 2016. The new company will pay a royalty based off revenues, 
minimizing Yum Brands’ exposure in China while still maintaining a presence in the area 
(Jargon, 2015). On the day of this announcement, shares were up 1.8%, as investors felt 
the spin-off would have a net positive effect in the long run. Still, the Chinese restaurants 
made up just under 17% of all Yum Brand restaurants, and were seen as a large avenue 
for future growth. In discussing where capital would go, Yum announced it would return 
“substantial” capital to shareholders and continue to leverage itself up, both of which are 
common criticisms in the field of activist investing (Jargon, 2015). Investors will have to 
wait to see what kind of effect Meister’s proposition will have on the company in the 
long-term. 
Elliott Capital Management: 
 Elliott Capital Management is a $7.2 billion fund run by Paul Singer. Currently, 
Elliott holds twelve positions in which it took an activist role, which can be seen in 
Appendix C. Of these twelve positions, four have outperformed their sector, seven have 
underperformed and one is neutral. When the weighted average is taken, Elliott’s current 
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positions have returned -5.5% compared to sector returns. Elliot Capital Management has 
also greatly underperformed the market as a whole, with a five year annualized return 
trailing the market by almost 8%. With so many activist positions, there are quite a few 
prominent positions, such as Cabela’s, EMC and Alcoa. One familiar position that Elliott 
has been in for quite some time is Hess. 
 During the end of 2015, Elliott initiated a position in Hess, and shortly thereafter 
created a presentation urging shareholders to get behind their proposal. In the company 
presentation, Elliott describes how they believe Hess is underutilizing its assets by 
investing in unnecessary and expensive operations, specifically in the Bakken Shale in 
North Dakota, which Elliot believed should be much more efficient (Elliott, 2013, 5-7). 
Elliott believed Hess should cut down on diversification and focus on where the money 
is, which to them was in natural gas (Sider & Warner, 2013). Still, some saw this as a 
mistake, and Elliott may agree in retrospect, as natural gas prices have stalled as the 
market continues to be flooded with supply. Oppenheimer analyst Fadel Gheit believed 
that splitting up a diversified company like Hess would be a mistake in the long run, and 
was quoted as saying "It makes no sense. It's cutting your nose to spite your face. You 
don't gain anything by doing that” (Sider & Warner, 2013). The market at the time 
disagreed, as shares increased over 9% on the announcement. Hess was hesitant to offer 
the board seats Elliott was asking for, but eventually caved and came to a compromise of 
three board members. Shares were down 2.8% on the date of the announcement (Helman, 
2013). In the three or so years since Elliott first initiated its position, Hess has an 
annualized return of -5.7% and has trailed the energy sector by approximately 1.4%. This 
a far cry from the 95%-153% upside projected by Elliott in the company’s presentation 
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(Elliott, 2013). Still, this position should be monitored into the future to see if the value 
can be unlocked over an extended period of time. 
Icahn Associates LP: 
 Icahn Associates LP is run by one of the most prominent and successful activists 
of all time, Carl Icahn, and is considered the largest activist hedge fund in the world, with 
over $27 billion in equity assets. While his historic track record is impressive, recently 
Icahn has not been seeing the same levels of success. All of Icahn’s twenty-one current 
activist positions can be seen in Appendix E. Of these positions, only five have 
outperformed their sector, while thirteen have underperformed and three have remained 
neutral. Of his current positions, Icahn has seen a weighted average excess sector return 
of -7.9%. Much like the first two activist funds, Carl Icahn has also trailed the market by 
approximately 3% on an annualized basis over the past five years. While there were 
numerous companies that could have been looked at in further detail, one interesting case 
that has not done well at all is Hertz Global Holdings, a well-known rental car company.  
Icahn initiated his $1.1 billion position in Hertz during the second quarter of 
2014, and just one quarter later managed to claim three seats on the board of directors, 
which Hertz granted rather than get into a proxy fight with Icahn, and the CEO was 
quickly replaced, though he had supposedly stepped down for “personal reasons” (De La 
Merced, 2014). Hertz also agreed to raise its trigger for a poison pill provision from a 
10% ownership up to 20%, presumably to allow Icahn to purchase more shares without 
risk of dilution. Icahn was not the only activist fund involved in Hertz, with both Third 
Point LLC and JANA Partners also holding stakes in the company (De La Merced, 2014). 
Since this announcement, shares have greatly underperformed the rest of the Industrial 
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sector, and Icahn’s cost basis return has underperformed the sector by almost 42%. Icahn 
will look to continue to rebuild Hertz while also focusing on other new positions, such as 
American International Group, which is more commonly known as AIG. It is certainly 
possible that Icahn is stretching himself too thin and simply has too much capital to 
allocate. 
JANA Partners: 
 JANA Partners is a $6.6 billion fund run by Barry Rosenstein. JANA has less of 
an activist presence than most hedge funds on this list, with only four activist positions 
making up just under 30% of its entire portfolio. These positions can be seen in Appendix 
G. Of these activist positions, JANA has two that are underperforming in their sectors 
and two that are outperforming, with a weighted average excess return of -0.4%. The 
entire fund has actually outperformed the market by over 3% in the past five years on an 
annualized basis, which may be another piece of evidence that persistent activism is not 
always the best investment strategy. One position JANA still currently holds that has 
garnered some attention is Qualcomm. An interesting note about JANA is that it tends to 
work with management behind the scenes rather than staging public proxy fights (Benoit 
& Clark, 2015). 
 Since JANA increased its position in Qualcomm from just over $300 million to 
just under $2 billion in the last quarter of 2014, shares have seen an annualized return of -
17.6%, which trails the sector returns over the same time period by 23.4%. Just three 
quarters after initiating its position in Qualcomm, JANA sold off over two thirds of its 
total position. Since there, shares have been relatively flat. In April of 2015, JANA asked 
management to consider cutting costs, increasing share buybacks and decreasing 
 Beck 34 
executive compensation, as well as spinning off its chip unit from its patent-licensing 
business, its primary source of profits (Benoit & Clark, 2015). Researchers at Arete 
Research Services claim that this spinoff could have had value, though Qualcomm 
eventually decided not to proceed with the spinoff. One such example where a spinoff 
proposed by JANA did not work out was in the oil-and-gas services company Oil States 
International, a position JANA eventually sold off due to poor performance (Benoit & 
Clark, 2015).  
Pershing Square Capital Management: 
 Another prominent activist hedge fund, Pershing Square Capital Management, is 
run by Bill Ackman. The fund is rather large, with $9.4 billion in equity assets. Pershing 
has a tendency of focusing in on a few companies that Ackman believes have the most 
potential. Pershing Square’s activist positions currently make up approximately 80% of 
its portfolio, with six total activist positions, which can all be seen in Appendix I. Of 
these positions, four have outperformed their sectors while two have underperformed. 
While the outperformers make up almost 77% of the activist positions in weight, Valeant 
Pharmaceuticals has been a huge drag on Pershing Square’s performance due to fears of 
impending pricing pressures and a recent scandal involving the potential overstatement of 
revenue (Goldstein & Stevenson, 2016). This severe drop in Valeant’s share price 
compared to Pershing Square’s cost basis (73.2%) has led to a weighted average excess 
return of positions of -3.9%. With Valeant certainly acting as a drain on Ackman, he has 
seen his fund trail the S&P 500 by about 7% on an annualized basis and fall almost 30% 
in the past year alone.  
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 Another interesting position for Ackman is his investment in Mondelez 
International. During the second quarter of 2015, Pershing Square invested over $1.8 
billion into Mondelez at a cost basis of $42.78, though this stake was said to be around 
$5.5 billion when options and forward contracts were taken into account. The investment 
by Ackman was one of the biggest in the history of shareholder activism. Ackman 
believed at the time that Mondelez had two choices: grow revenues and severely cut costs 
or find a buyer (Benoit, Hoffman & Gasparro, 2015). At the time, it was believed that 
Ackman was counting on an acquisition, which, given the fact that Mondelez had a 
market capitalization of $75.6 billion, was an aggressive bet. Because of Mondelez’s size, 
one of the only food companies that would be able to acquire it is Kraft Heinz Co. 
Ironically enough, another activist with a stake in the company, Nelson Peltz of Trian 
Fund Management (see below) was the one to originally press for the division of Kraft 
and Mondelez. Still, with Kraft Heinz under new management, there is believed to be 
room for value in the potential merger (Benoit et al., 2015). Just half a year after 
initiating the position, Ackman announced he was selling off almost half of his position, 
but said in a letter to investors, “we are reducing the position size for portfolio 
management purposes only” (Goldstein & Stevenson, 2016). Mondelez has lost almost 
6% since Ackman initiated the position while the Consumer Staples industry has done 
well, leading to a loss of 21.5% compared to the sector. Some have speculated the 
Mondelez selloff is due to the large loss in Valeant, though Pershing Square still plans to 
stay in its position and take a more active role. Both positions should be monitored 
moving forward (Goldstein & Stevenson, 2016).  
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Third Point LLC: 
 Third Point LLC is run by Daniel Loeb and has just under $10 billion in equity 
assets, with roughly one quarter of the fund’s money tied up in activist positions. Of the 
three positions, one has outperformed its sector and the other two have underperformed. 
The good news for Third Point is that the position that has outperformed, Baxter 
International, has outperformed the sector by more than 20% since the activist position 
was initiated. The other two are smaller positions and have underperformed by around 
20-25%. The total weighted average excess sector return for Third Point is 16%, which 
was the by far the best performance among activists regarding current activist positions, 
though this may be due to a small sample size and the large return on one heavily 
weighted position. As a whole, Third Point’s selective activism seems to be paying off 
much like JANA Partners. They have seen a five year annualized return that has 
outperformed the market by over 2.5%. Though Baxter is a much larger activist position 
held by Third Point, Sotheby’s is also an interesting story.  
 Loeb initiated a large position in Sotheby’s, an auction house of primarily fine art, 
during the first and second quarters of 2014. During the second quarter of 2014, Loeb 
was able to get three board seats by coming to an agreement with the company to end his 
proxy fight and cap the fund’s ownership at 15% (Kazakina, 2014). Loeb planned to 
curtail the company’s executive compensation, improve internal operations and 
strengthen a weakening competitive position. Shareholders were supportive of this 
announcement, with shares rising 3.2% that day (Kazakina, 2014). This battle did not 
come without its negatives for shareholders, however. The company stated that it 
incurred a special charge of $20.1 million during the fight with Loeb (Frank, 2014). This 
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charge has yet to pay dividends for the company, as since Loeb initiated his position, 
shares have trailed the Consumer Discretionary sector by an annualized return of 25.9% 
based on Third Point’s $41.22 cost basis. As of the end of the first quarter of 2016, shares 
traded at $26.39. 
Trian Fund Management: 
 Trian Fund Management is a fund with about $12.5 billion in equity assets, run by 
legendary activist investor Nelson Peltz, who has a reputation of being one of the 
friendlier activist investors. Of the eight positions that have had activism, Peltz has seen 
three outperform their sector, four underperform, and one stay on pace with its sector. 
Due to the weights of each position and the amount of excess return, Trian has seen the 
currently held activist positions outperform their sectors by a weighted average of 1.5%. 
All eight positions can be seen in Appendix M. As a whole, the fund has trailed the 
market over the past five years by almost 2% on an annualized basis. The activist position 
that has been chosen to focus on is DuPont, which was actually one of Peltz’s few 
unsuccessful campaigns in recent years.  
 The fund first initiated a position in DuPont back in the first quarter of 2013, 
though Trian simply held the position until the third quarter of 2014, when it greatly 
increased its position from around 7 million shares, valued at about $425 million, up to 
just over 24 million shares, valued just over $1.5 billion. During the third and fourth 
quarters of 2014, Trian began pushing for a breakup of DuPont, claiming that corporate 
expenses were much higher than they needed to be and the company had made numerous 
acquisitions that were not paying off (Gara, 2015). DuPont’s CEO, Ellen Kullman, made 
the case that during her tenure at DuPont, shares had outperformed both the sector and 
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the overall market. Shareholders stood by Kullman and DuPont’s management team, and 
chose not to elect any member of Trian to the board (Gara, 2015). When news of this 
announcement broke, shares fell 6%, showing that investors continue to value the opinion 
of activists. Some did criticize Trian for trying to step into a well-run company, which 
was seen as somewhat unnecessary (Gara, 2015). Since initiating its activist position in 
DuPont in the third quarter of 2014, the Materials sector has declined by 6.5%. Based on 
its cost average basis, shares of DuPont have improved by 2.2%, giving Trian an excess 
sector return of 8.7%. During the third quarter of 2015, Trian sold off about 5.6 million 
shares, reducing its current stake in DuPont to just under $1.3 billion. 
ValueAct Capital Management: 
 ValueAct Capital Management is also one of the larger players in the activist 
hedge fund space, with equity assets of around $12.8 billion and a solid track record to go 
with it. ValueAct is run by Jeffery Ubben and primarily invests in positions where it 
plans to take an activist role. Currently, the fund holds eleven activist positions, with six 
outperforming their sectors and five underperforming. The total weighted average excess 
return for ValueAct is currently 0.9%, with somewhat even distributions on both sides. 
All of ValueAct’s positions can be seen in Appendix O. ValueAct has managed to 
produce above-market returns for the firm’s investors, seeing its five year return 
outperform the market by almost 6.5% on an annual basis. One interesting position in this 
fund is Microsoft, as ValueAct made activist history by being the first firm to achieve a 
board seat on a company with less than a 1% ownership (Ovide, 2013). The firm initiated 
its position in Microsoft during the fourth quarter of 2012 moving into the first quarter of 
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2013, though it took about half a year and a lot of persuading other investors for the fund 
to gain a board seat. 
 ValueAct was also instrumental in removing Steve Ballmer as CEO, according to 
many different sources. Ballmer had just recently engineered a reorganization of the 
company, so for him to “voluntarily” step down was puzzling to many (Ovide, 2013). 
ValueAct’s president, Mason Morfit, was chosen to sit on the Microsoft board with the 
promise from ValueAct that they would not begin a proxy contest, seek an extraordinary 
transaction, or take on more than a 5% stake in Microsoft (Vardi, 2013). Since ValueAct 
initiated its position, Microsoft has outperformed the Technology sector by 8.6%, 
demonstrating the value that ValueAct has added (no pun intended), at least in the 
relative short run. The fund recently sold off about 18.6 million shares, reducing its stake 
in the company to 56.6 million shares, which currently amounts to a 0.7% stake.  
Summary of the Current Landscape: 
Figure 8: 
 
As can be seen above in Figure 8, eight of the most prominent hedge funds, when 
size is accounted for, actually trail their positions’ sector returns on a weighted average 
basis by 2.7%. Obviously, as was stated before, these managers often sell off positions 
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with gains in order to focus on companies that may struggle in the next few years and 
attempt to engineer a long-term comeback. Regardless, it is clear managers are 
underperforming with their current positions, though the best way to analyze the long-
term effects would be to revisit these positions twenty or thirty years from now to see the 
effect these managers have over the very long-term. As was stated in the Delaware 
Supreme Court paper “The rights and duties of blockholder directors,” an infinite holding 
period (to perpetuity) should be the formal view for the board of directors on how to 
approach adding value to the company (Laster & Zeberkiewicz, 2015). Another 
interesting point is that of these eight firms, only three have outperformed the market 
over the last five years, and two of those firms are not aggressive activists; that is, they 
are very selective with their activism targets and do not abuse the system. This seems to 
be another beacon of proof showing that activism has gone too far. 
Since one could dispute the validity of this case study method, another method 
was considered. A mutual fund called the 13D Activist Fund was constructed on 
December 29, 2011, and it attempts to track the positions activist hedge funds initiate by 
monitoring for 13D filings, which signify an activist position (13D Management, 2016). 
It should be noted that the earlier study includes positions for which a 13D was not filed, 
as sometimes activism can take more of a passive role and involve simply a board seat 
being granted voluntarily or discussions between shareholders and the board. Also, a 13D 
filing is only needed when a shareholder acquires more than 5% of a given publicly 
traded company. Often times, investors can work in groups to acquire more than 5%, but 
do not need to file a 13D because they individually do not have more than 5% (Baldwin 
& Merkley, 2016). Also, a 5% stake is not always needed to take an activist role, which 
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can be seen in various examples above, such as ValueAct’s position in Microsoft while 
only owning less than 1% of shares outstanding. When tracking the performance of the 
13D fund and viewing cumulative returns compared to the S&P 500, one can see the fund 
has clearly underperformed since its inception, according to data compiled from 
Bloomberg. The results can be seen on the next page in Figure 9. This is just another 
reason to question how effective current shareholder activism is, and whether its use has 
become overblown. 
Figure 9: 
Future Outlook: 
 In conclusion, it is crucial that we take a look at what shareholder activism has 
turned into. In a report published by J.P. Morgan on shareholder activism in January of 
2015, it was reported that from the start of 2001 until almost the end of 2014, 47% of all 
activist hedge funds campaign positions were held for under six months and 68% were 
held for under a year. Only 8% of all campaigns led to hedge funds holding the position 
for more than three years (Corporate, 2015). For hedge funds that claim to be coming in 
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to unlock long-term value, this seems like an astoundingly low number. It is important to 
note, as has been mentioned previously in this paper, that not all activism is rooted in 
short-term profit. Lawrence Fink, CEO of Blackrock, says it best when he explains, 
“we’re not against activists…we believe they play an important role in the ecosystem, 
and other times I believe they activate for a short-term profit and may be impairing the 
company” (Benoit, 2015). There are two sides to the coin. 
 After researching this topic and thinking critically about potential future 
legislation, a few ideas to curtail the short-run nature of activism come to mind, though 
there are obvious drawbacks to some of these suggestions. One would be to simply 
mandate that any investor who takes an activist position would be required to hold the 
investment for a certain amount of time, ideally at least three years. The reason for this 
would be to make managers take a long-term approach rather than coming in and 
committing financial engineering through the use of share buybacks and dividends. This 
way, the only reason activists would recommend this course of action is if they truly 
believed it was the best long-term course of action. Still, a holding period of only three 
years could result in positive share appreciation without actually adding long-term value, 
so there is a flaw to this.  
 Another potential legislative measure that could be put in place is a provision 
limiting the number of activist positions in which one fund or investor can participate. 
This way, investors and funds would not be spreading themselves too thin. One downside 
here is that diversification is a critical aspect of investing, and this provision could 
severely limit the diversification of assets. An alternative that would not limit 
diversification would be a rule that limits the percentage of assets activists could have in 
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their funds devoted to activist positions. While this could sound good on the surface, 
many investors would likely begin making deals behind closed doors, and corruption and 
unethical behavior could increase as a result.  
It is also possible that shareholder activism must be accepted as a part of the 
markets, as there are positive aspects and it seems very difficult to control. If 
management and activists can work together to come to agreements that increase long-
term shareholder returns, activism could have an extremely positive economic effect. 
According to McKinsey, activist campaigns in which management and shareholders 
collaborated led to excess returns compared to combative relationships. Still, a majority 
of campaigns begin friendly and turn hostile when management does not want to act on 
some shareholder recommendations. 73% of all campaigns begin friendly, but only 40% 
end in a friendly manner, showing the stark contrast as time moves on (Cyriac, De 
Backer & Sanders, 2014). 
On March 7, 2016, two senators, Tammy Baldwin and Jeff Merkley, introduced a 
bill aiming at strengthing oversight among activist hedge funds. In the bill proposal they 
claim, “Once there, they make demands to benefit themselves at the expense of the 
company’s long-term interests. The most common demands are for more debt, stock 
buybacks, reduced R&D, cost-cutting, layoffs, and general reduction any investment in 
long-term growth” (Baldwin & Merkley, 2016). In their bill, they list three suggestions to 
curtail this brand of negative activism. One is to shorten the window of disclosure time of 
initiating an activist position from ten days to two days, as many funds will tip one 
another off and allow for risk-free returns when the 13D form is eventually filed. Next, 
the bill attempts to aggregate all funds held by investors, as many individual managers 
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collectively control more than 5% of a company, but their individual single entities might 
not, so the threshold is not breached and therefore a 13D need not be filed (Baldwin & 
Merkley, 2016).  
Perhaps the most critical suggestion in the bill comes last. According to Baldwin 
and Merkley, many activists have net short positions in their activist positions, so it is 
often in their best interest for share prices to decline. Companies are not required to 
disclose derivative positions in their 13D filings, so it is certainly possible funds can 
profit from the fall in the price of a stock they have taken an activist role in. This would 
obviously incentivize the fund to vote against the company’s best interest (Baldwin & 
Merkely, 2016). These suggestions all seem to make sense, though the sway of activists 
in the political world could make it difficult for the bill to pass, as with such large stakes 
on the line, funds will stop at nothing to make sure they do not lose control.  
When all aspects are considered, it is clear shareholder activism needs an 
overhaul, though its positive aspects and ability to give shareholders their legal right to a 
voice cannot be ignored. Still, the negatives of the short-term nature of some activist 
funds also cannot be overlooked. If we are attempting to answer the original question of 
what the long term effects of current shareholder activism are, the true answer is we do 
not know at this time. We can only hypothesize what this short-term investment approach 
is doing to the long-term stability of these companies in this current landscape, but some 
type of legislation should be enacted in order to prevent activists who are only concerned 
with quarterly returns for their funds. 
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Appendix A – Corvex Management Activist Positions 
 
 
 
Signet Jewelers 2013 Q4 863,254 863,254 74.25 64,096,610      
Sector: 7.8% 2014 Q1 5,490,633 4,627,379 85.95 471,919,906    
Consumer Discretionary 2014 Q2 5,632,411 141,778 102.56 577,660,072    
Cost basis: 2014 Q3 5,510,911 (121,500) 110.57 609,341,429    
$90.91 2014 Q4 5,510,911 0 119.06 656,129,064    
Time Held: 2015 Q1 5,745,911 235,000 123.88 711,803,455    
2.50 2015 Q2 5,122,070 (623,841) 133.13 681,901,179    
Annualized Return: 2015 Q3 5,052,070 (70,000) 126.40 638,581,648    
13.1% 2015 Q4 5,629,153 577,083 132.33 744,905,816    
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2016 Q1 5,629,153 0 113.48 638,796,282    
5.3% 2016 Q2 5,629,153 0 123.68 696,213,643    
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Williams Companies 2012 Q1 150,700 23.52 3,544,464        
Sector: 2012 Q2 0 (150,700) 24.97 -                   
Energy 2012 Q3 1,136,075 1,136,075 26.29 29,867,412      
Cost basis: 2012 Q4 3,561,475 2,425,400 27.58 98,225,481      
$33.27 2013 Q1 5,832,466 2,270,991 29.05 169,433,137    
Annualized Return: 2013 Q2 12,153,266 6,320,800 30.17 366,664,035    
-16.1% 2013 Q3 13,603,266 1,450,000 30.04 408,642,111    
Time Held: 2013 Q4 13,603,266 0 31.05 422,381,409    
4.25 -14.7% 2014 Q1 41,682,960 28,079,694 35.25 1,469,324,340 
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2014 Q2 41,682,960 0 43.69 1,821,128,522 
-1.4% 2014 Q3 41,682,960 0 50.87 2,120,412,175 
2014 Q4 41,682,960 0 44.75 1,865,312,460 
2015 Q1 41,682,960 0 41.83 1,743,598,217 
2015 Q2 41,682,960 0 49.73 2,072,893,601 
2015 Q3 41,682,960 0 44.82 1,868,230,267 
2015 Q4 41,682,960 0 30.99 1,291,754,930 
2016 Q1 41,682,960 0 16.22 676,097,611    
2016 Q2 41,682,960 0 15.78 657,757,109    
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
YUM! Brands 2015 Q1 856,500           74.41 63,732,165      
Sector: 5.0% 2015 Q2 15,288,309      14,431,809 86.49 1,322,285,845 
Consumer Discretionary 2015 Q3 20,040,195      4,751,886 82.51 1,653,516,489 
Cost basis: 2016 Q1 21,040,195      1,000,000 71.30 1,500,165,904 
$84.38 2016 Q2 21,040,195      0 72.24 1,519,943,687 
Annualized Return:
-11.7%
Time Held:
1.25
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-16.7%
Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter
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Appendix B – Corvex Management Activist Scorecard 
 
FNF Group 0.4% 2014 Q2 18,285,547 18,285,547 26.54 485,298,417    
Sector: 2014 Q3 20,241,370 1,955,823 26.75 541,456,648    
Financials 2014 Q4 20,241,370 0 29.54 597,930,070    
Cost basis: 2015 Q1 20,241,370 0 35.39 716,342,084    
$26.64 2015 Q2 20,403,470 162,100 36.37 742,074,204    
Annualized Return: 2015 Q3 19,366,915 (1,036,555) 37.00 716,575,855    
9.8% 2015 Q4 18,877,033 (489,882) 34.60 653,145,342    
Time Held: 2016 Q1 18,877,033 0 32.09 605,763,989    
2.00 2016 Q2 18,877,033 0 32.09 605,763,989    
Excess Return vs. Sector:
9.4%
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
Vereit Inc 2014 Q4 8,010,400 8,010,400 8.72 69,850,688      
Sector: -7.3% 2015 Q1 70,644,429 62,634,029 9.11 643,570,748    
Financials 2015 Q2 72,846,529 2,202,100 8.62 627,937,080    
Cost basis: 2015 Q3 80,608,053 7,761,524 7.94 640,027,941    
$8.94 2015 Q4 79,919,153 (688,900) 7.91 632,160,500    
Annualized Return: 2016 Q1 44,360,189 (35,558,964) 7.82 346,896,678    
-1.3% 2016 Q2 44,360,189 0 8.77 389,038,858    
Time Held:
1.50
Excess Return vs. Sector:
6.0%
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Fund:
Current Activist Positions: 5 -3.8%
Outperform: 3 6.9% 43.7% 3.0%
Underperform: 2 -12.1% 56.3% -6.8%
Neutral*: 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
*within 1% of Sector Return
Corvex Management
Activist Position Scorecard
Current 
Weight
Weigthed 
Average Return
Number of 
Positions
Total Weighted 
Activist Return
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Appendix C – Elliot Capital Management Activist Positions 
 
 
  
 
Cabela's 13.5% 2015 Q4 4,165,000 4,165,000 41.44 172,597,600        
Sector: 2016 Q1 6,046,496 1,881,496 44.63 269,855,116        
Consumer Discretionary 2016 Q2 6,046,496 0 48.89 295,613,189        
Cost basis:
$42.44
Annualized Return:
32.7%
Time Held:
0.50
Excess Return vs. Sector:
19.2%
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Interpublic Group 2014 Q2 3,170,000 3,170,000 17.51 55,506,700          
Sector: 10.2% 2014 Q3 19,682,326 16,512,326 18.70 368,059,496        
Consumer Discretionary 2014 Q4 19,682,326 0 18.09 356,053,277        
Cost basis: 2015 Q1 19,682,326 0 20.51 403,684,506        
$18.54 2015 Q2 20,015,326 333,000 20.30 406,311,118        
Annualized Return: 2015 Q3 20,015,326 0 19.57 391,699,930        
11.0% 2015 Q4 20,015,326 0 22.02 440,737,479        
Time Held: 2016 Q1 15,561,426 (4,453,900) 21.49 334,415,045        
2.00 2016 Q2 15,561,426 0 22.84 355,422,970        
Excess Return vs. Sector:
0.8%
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
Hess Corporation 2012 Q4 1,213,500 1,213,500 49.69 60,298,815          
Sector: -4.3% 2013 Q1 15,000,000 13,786,500 62.49 937,350,000        
Energy 2013 Q2 16,650,000 1,650,000 66.20 1,102,230,000     
Cost basis: 2013 Q3 17,095,000 445,000 71.71 1,225,882,450     
$63.30 2013 Q4 17,095,000 0 78.23 1,337,341,850     
Annualized Return: 2014 Q1 17,300,000 205,000 76.68 1,326,564,000     
-5.7% 2014 Q2 17,300,000 0 87.30 1,510,290,000     
Time Held: 2014 Q3 17,800,000 500,000 96.18 1,712,004,000     
3.50 2014 Q4 17,800,000 0 76.39 1,359,742,000     
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2015 Q1 17,800,000 0 69.52 1,237,456,000     
-1.4% 2015 Q2 17,800,000 0 69.80 1,242,440,000     
2015 Q3 17,800,000 0 56.34 1,002,852,000     
2015 Q4 17,800,000 0 55.83 993,774,000        
2016 Q1 17,800,000 0 42.21 751,338,000        
2016 Q2 17,800,000 0 51.60 918,480,000        
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
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Opus Bank 0.4% 2014 Q2 5,301,279 5,301,279 29.35 155,592,539        
Sector: 2014 Q3 5,301,279 0 29.82 158,084,140        
Financials 2014 Q4 5,301,279 0 27.33 144,883,955        
Cost basis: 2015 Q1 5,301,279 0 28.17 149,337,029        
$29.35 2015 Q2 5,301,279 0 32.83 174,040,990        
Annualized Return: 2015 Q3 5,301,279 0 37.26 197,525,656        
8.0% 2015 Q4 5,051,279 (250,000) 37.24 188,109,630        
Time Held: 2016 Q1 5,051,279 0 32.73 165,328,362        
2.00 2016 Q2 5,051,279 0 34.21 172,804,255        
Excess Return vs. Sector:
7.6%
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
National Bank Holdings 12.2% 2012 Q3 3,825,543 3,825,543 19.14 73,220,893          
Sector: 2012 Q4 3,812,500 (13,043) 17.92 68,320,000          
Financials 2013 Q1 3,812,500 0 17.91 68,281,875          
Cost basis: 2013 Q2 3,812,500 0 18.16 69,235,000          
$19.14 2013 Q3 3,812,500 0 19.53 74,458,125          
Annualized Return: 2013 Q4 3,610,436 (202,064) 20.37 73,544,581          
1.7% 2014 Q1 3,610,436 0 19.70 71,125,589          
Time Held: 2014 Q2 3,610,436 0 19.26 69,536,997          
3.75 2014 Q3 3,610,436 0 19.52 70,475,711          
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2014 Q4 3,610,436 0 18.99 68,562,180          
-10.5% 2015 Q1 3,610,436 0 18.21 65,746,040          
2015 Q2 3,360,436 (250,000) 19.43 65,293,271          
2015 Q3 3,102,835 (257,601) 20.71 64,259,713          
2015 Q4 3,102,835 0 21.37 66,307,584          
2016 Q1 3,102,835 0 19.72 61,187,906          
2016 Q2 3,102,835 0 20.39 63,266,806          
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
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Vereit Inc 2014 Q4 8,010,400 8,010,400 8.72 69,850,688          
Sector: -7.3% 2015 Q1 70,644,429 62,634,029 9.11 643,570,748        
Financials 2015 Q2 72,846,529 2,202,100 8.62 627,937,080        
Cost basis: 2015 Q3 80,608,053 7,761,524 7.94 640,027,941        
$8.94 2015 Q4 79,919,153 (688,900) 7.91 632,160,500        
Annualized Return: 2016 Q1 44,360,189 (35,558,964) 7.82 346,896,678        
-1.4% 2016 Q2 8,801,225 0 8.75 77,010,719          
Time Held:
1.50
Excess Return vs. Sector:
5.9%
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
CDK 5.8% 2015 Q1 2,590,000 2,590,000 44.79 116,006,100        
Sector: 2015 Q2 6,594,215 4,004,215 51.16 337,360,039        
Information Technology 2015 Q3 7,936,315 1,342,100 50.16 398,085,560        
Cost basis: 2015 Q4 8,045,794 109,479 48.19 387,726,813        
$48.90 2016 Q1 8,045,794 0 44.09 354,739,057        
Annualized Return: 2016 Q2 8,045,794 0 46.23 371,957,057        
-4.4%
Time Held:
1.25
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-10.2%
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change Position Value
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Mitel Networks 2015 Q1 2,673,602 2,673,602 9.81 26,228,036          
Sector: 2015 Q2 3,288,545 614,943 9.30 30,583,469          
Information Technology 9.6% 2015 Q3 11,372,874 8,084,329 8.09 92,006,551          
Cost basis: 2015 Q4 11,548,871 175,997 8.09 93,430,366          
$8.55 2016 Q1 11,548,871 0 7.14 82,458,939          
Annualized Return: 2016 Q2 11,548,871 0 8.03 92,737,434          
-4.9%
Time Held:
1.25
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-14.5%
Position Value
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
ChangeSharesStart of Quarter
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Position Information
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EMC 2014 Q2 2,365,000 2,365,000 25.45 60,189,250          
Sector: 8.7% 2014 Q3 33,500,000 31,135,000 28.03 939,005,000        
Information Technology 2014 Q4 33,500,000 0 28.17 943,695,000        
Cost basis: 2015 Q1 33,500,000 0 26.71 894,785,000        
$27.49 2015 Q2 33,600,000 100,000 26.14 878,304,000        
Annualized Return: 2015 Q3 34,000,000 400,000 24.86 845,240,000        
-1.7% 2015 Q4 42,231,000 8,231,000 26.20 1,106,452,200     
Time Held: 2016 Q1 42,231,000 0 24.98 1,054,930,380     
2.00 2016 Q2 42,231,000 0 26.56 1,121,655,360     
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-10.4%
Position Value
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
ChangeShares
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Position Information Start of Quarter
Polycom 9.6% 2015 Q3 7,320,814 7,320,814 10.94 80,089,705          
Sector: 2015 Q4 8,850,892 1,530,078 12.95 114,619,051        
Information Technology 2016 Q1 8,850,892 0 10.49 92,845,857          
Cost basis: 2016 Q2 8,850,892 0 11.00 97,359,812          
$11.29
Annualized Return:
-3.4%
Time Held:
0.75
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-13.1%
Position ValueShares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter
Alcoa 26.0% 2015 Q4 67,100,000 67,100,000 9.28 622,688,000        
Sector: 2016 Q1 77,600,000 10,500,000 8.28 642,528,000        
Materials 2016 Q2 77,600,000 0 9.50 737,200,000        
Cost basis:
$9.14
Annualized Return:
8.0%
Time Held:
0.50
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-18.0%
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
 Beck 57 
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Appendix E – Icahn Associates Corporation Activist Positions  
Federal-Mogul Holdings 9.4% 2007 Q4 25,141,924 25,141,924 29.50 741,686,758
Sector: 2008 Q1 75,241,924 50,100,000 20.16 1,516,877,188
Consumer Discretionary 2008 Q2 75,241,924 0 18.90 1,422,072,364
Cost basis: 2008 Q3 75,241,924 0 15.01 1,129,381,279
$19.37 2008 Q4 75,241,924 0 5.79 435,650,740
Annualized Return: 2009 Q1 75,241,924 0 5.07 381,476,555
-7.9% 2009 Q2 75,241,924 0 9.65 726,084,567
Time Held: 2009 Q3 75,241,924 0 12.12 911,932,119
8.50 2009 Q4 75,241,924 0 13.87 1,043,605,486
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2010 Q1 75,241,924 0 17.94 1,349,840,117
-17.3% 2010 Q2 75,241,924 0 17.44 1,312,219,155
2010 Q3 75,241,924 0 16.70 1,256,540,131
2010 Q4 75,241,924 0 19.97 1,502,581,222
2011 Q1 75,241,924 0 23.20 1,745,612,637
2011 Q2 75,241,924 0 23.51 1,768,937,633
2011 Q3 75,980,915 738,991 17.32 1,315,989,448
2011 Q4 76,385,255 404,340 15.44 1,179,388,337
2012 Q1 76,385,255 0 16.82 1,284,799,989
2012 Q2 76,385,255 0 12.77 975,439,706
2012 Q3 76,697,804 312,549 9.98 765,444,084
2012 Q4 76,697,804 0 8.00 613,582,432
2013 Q1 76,697,804 0 7.78 596,708,915
2013 Q2 76,697,804 0 8.27 634,290,839
2013 Q3 121,111,976 44,414,172 15.08 1,826,368,598
2013 Q4 121,111,976 0 19.00 2,301,127,544
2014 Q1 121,111,976 0 18.70 2,264,793,951
2014 Q2 121,111,976 0 18.04 2,184,860,047
2014 Q3 121,111,976 0 17.28 2,092,814,945
2014 Q4 121,111,976 0 15.30 1,853,013,233
2015 Q1 138,590,141 17,478,165 13.81 1,913,929,847
2015 Q2 138,590,141 0 12.65 1,753,165,284
2015 Q3 138,590,141 0 9.30 1,288,888,311
2015 Q4 138,590,141 0 7.69 1,065,758,184
2016 Q1 138,590,141 0 6.95 963,201,480
2016 Q2 138,590,141 0 9.66 1,338,780,762
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Fund:
Current Activist Positions: 12 -5.5%
Outperform: 4 11.4% 16.4% 1.9%
Underperform: 7 -9.8% 75.7% -7.4%
Neutral*: 1 0.8% 7.9% 0.1%
*within 1% of Sector Return
Activist Position Scorecard
Elliot Capital Mangement
Number of 
Positions
Weigthed 
Average Return
Current 
Weight
Total Weighted 
Activist Return
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Gannett Co 5.0% 2015 Q2 7,483,683 7,483,683 13.86 103,723,846
Sector: 2015 Q3 7,483,683 0 12.52 93,695,711
Consumer Discretionary 2015 Q4 6,502,574 (981,109) 15.71 102,155,438
Cost basis: 2016 Q1 5,379,063 (1,123,511) 14.95 80,416,992
$13.86 2016 Q2 5,379,063 0 14.99 80,632,154
Annualized Return:
8.2%
Time Held:
1.00
Excess Return vs. Sector:
3.2%
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
Tegna 2014 Q2 2,734,888 2,734,888 21.45 58,663,348
Sector: 10.2% 2014 Q3 14,967,373 12,232,485 25.19 377,028,126
Consumer Discretionary 2014 Q4 14,967,373 0 23.39 350,086,854
Cost basis: 2015 Q1 14,967,373 0 26.15 391,396,804
$24.51 2015 Q2 14,967,373 0 28.35 424,325,025
Annualized Return: 2015 Q3 14,967,373 0 26.32 393,941,257
-4.0% 2015 Q4 12,771,865 (2,195,508) 25.95 331,429,897
Time Held: 2016 Q1 10,711,599 (2,060,266) 23.54 252,151,040
2.00 2016 Q2 10,711,599 0 22.57 241,760,789
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-14.2%
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Cheniere Energy 2015 Q2 1,075,000 1,075,000 74.16 79,722,000
Sector: -22.8% 2015 Q3 28,546,241 27,471,241 60.08 1,715,058,159
Energy 2015 Q4 32,680,490 4,134,249 44.93 1,468,334,416
Cost basis: 2016 Q1 32,680,490 0 31.64 1,034,010,704
$58.62 2016 Q2 32,680,490 0 33.53 1,095,776,830
Annualized Return:
-42.8%
Time Held:
1.00
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-20.0%
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
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Chesapeake Energy 2011 Q2 5,220,156 5,220,156 27.43 143,188,879
Sector: 2011 Q3 5,220,156 0 27.54 143,763,096
Energy 2011 Q4 5,220,156 0 22.80 119,019,557
Cost basis: 2012 Q1 5,220,156 0 20.72 108,161,632
$17.26 -3.6% 2012 Q2 50,085,202 44,865,046 15.49 775,819,779
Annualized Return: 2012 Q3 50,085,202 0 17.20 861,465,474
-25.5% 2012 Q4 59,698,689 9,613,487 16.49 984,431,382
Time Held: 2013 Q1 59,698,689 0 17.83 1,064,427,625
5.00 2013 Q2 59,698,689 0 18.71 1,116,962,471
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2013 Q3 66,450,000 6,751,311 22.70 1,508,415,000
-21.9% 2013 Q4 66,450,000 0 24.76 1,645,302,000
2014 Q1 66,450,000 0 23.76 1,578,852,000
2014 Q2 66,450,000 0 26.69 1,773,550,500
2014 Q3 66,450,000 0 25.94 1,723,713,000
2014 Q4 66,450,000 0 20.18 1,340,961,000
2015 Q1 73,050,000 6,600,000 16.75 1,223,587,500
2015 Q2 73,050,000 0 14.10 1,030,005,000
2015 Q3 73,050,000 0 8.49 620,194,500
2015 Q4 73,050,000 0 6.05 441,952,500
2016 Q1 73,050,000 0 3.66 267,363,000
2016 Q2 73,050,000 0 3.96 289,278,000
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
CVR Energy 2011 Q4 3,829,939 3,829,939 17.66 67,636,723
Sector: 2012 Q1 12,584,227 8,754,288 21.19 266,659,770
Energy -3.6% 2012 Q2 71,198,718 58,614,491 24.08 1,714,465,129
Cost basis: 2012 Q3 71,198,718 0 25.68 1,828,383,078
$23.38 2012 Q4 71,198,718 0 35.32 2,514,738,720
Annualized Return: 2013 Q1 71,198,718 0 45.17 3,216,046,092
1.4% 2013 Q2 71,198,718 0 46.71 3,325,692,118
Time Held: 2013 Q3 71,198,718 0 37.29 2,655,000,194
4.50 2013 Q4 71,198,718 0 33.44 2,380,885,130
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2014 Q1 71,198,718 0 34.91 2,485,547,245
5.1% 2014 Q2 71,198,718 0 42.20 3,004,585,900
2014 Q3 71,198,718 0 43.84 3,121,351,797
2014 Q4 71,198,718 0 40.80 2,904,907,694
2015 Q1 71,198,718 0 36.99 2,633,640,579
2015 Q2 71,198,718 0 37.58 2,675,647,822
2015 Q3 71,198,718 0 38.10 2,712,671,156
2015 Q4 71,198,718 0 41.97 2,988,210,194
2016 Q1 71,198,718 0 27.79 1,978,612,373
2016 Q2 71,198,718 0 24.94 1,775,696,027
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
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CVR Refining LP -4.3% 2013 Q1 4,000,000 4,000,000 19.58 78,320,000
Sector: 2013 Q2 6,000,000 2,000,000 21.95 131,700,000
Energy 2013 Q3 6,000,000 0 19.90 119,400,000
Cost basis: 2013 Q4 6,000,000 0 17.33 103,980,000
$20.37 2014 Q1 6,000,000 0 17.11 102,660,000
Annualized Return: 2014 Q2 6,000,000 0 20.60 123,600,000
6.5% 2014 Q3 6,000,000 0 20.42 122,520,000
Time Held: 2014 Q4 6,000,000 0 18.19 109,140,000
3.25 2015 Q1 6,000,000 0 15.28 91,680,000
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2015 Q2 6,000,000 0 18.17 109,020,000
10.8% 2015 Q3 6,000,000 0 18.15 108,900,000
2015 Q4 6,000,000 0 20.33 121,980,000
2016 Q1 6,000,000 0 13.64 81,840,000
2016 Q2 6,000,000 0 25.00 150,000,000
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Transocean 2012 Q4 5,838,386 5,838,386 39.08 228,164,125
Sector: -4.3% 2013 Q1 20,154,035 14,315,649 45.45 916,000,891
Energy 2013 Q2 21,477,900 1,323,865 43.23 928,489,617
Cost basis: 2013 Q3 21,477,900 0 40.49 869,640,171
$43.58 2013 Q4 21,477,900 0 42.81 919,468,899
Annualized Return: 2014 Q1 21,477,900 0 37.77 811,220,283
-37.1% 2014 Q2 21,477,900 0 37.80 811,864,620
Time Held: 2014 Q3 21,477,900 0 34.64 743,994,456
3.50 2014 Q4 21,477,900 0 22.31 479,171,949
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2015 Q1 21,477,900 0 15.62 335,484,798
-32.8% 2015 Q2 21,477,900 0 17.90 384,454,410
2015 Q3 21,477,900 0 13.71 294,462,009
2015 Q4 21,477,900 0 14.61 313,792,119
2016 Q1 21,477,900 0 10.03 215,423,337
2016 Q2 21,477,900 0 8.59 184,495,161
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
AIG 2015 Q3 1,361,326 1,361,326 59.92 81,570,654
Sector: -1.4% 2015 Q4 42,244,071 40,882,745 60.34 2,549,007,244
Financials 2016 Q1 42,244,071 0 53.78 2,271,886,138
Cost basis: 2016 Q2 42,244,071 0 54.32 2,294,697,937
$60.33
Annualized Return:
-13.1%
Time Held:
0.75
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-11.6%
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
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Hologic 12.4% 2013 Q4 34,154,879 34,154,879 21.66 739,794,679
Sector: 2014 Q1 34,154,879 0 21.48 733,646,801
Health Care 2014 Q2 34,154,879 0 23.24 793,759,388
Cost basis: 2014 Q3 34,154,879 0 25.25 862,410,695
$21.66 2014 Q4 34,154,879 0 25.38 866,850,829
Annualized Return: 2015 Q1 34,154,879 0 30.45 1,040,016,066
20.7% 2015 Q2 34,154,879 0 35.19 1,201,910,192
Time Held: 2015 Q3 28,154,879 (6,000,000) 39.70 1,117,748,696
2.50 2015 Q4 28,154,879 0 38.74 1,090,720,012
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2016 Q1 19,171,287 (8,983,592) 34.68 664,860,233
8.3% 2016 Q2 19,171,287 0 34.65 664,285,095
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Enzon Pharmaceuticals 2008 Q1 614,420 614,420 8.71 5,351,598
Sector: 2008 Q2 614,420 0 8.77 5,388,463
Health Care 2008 Q3 614,420 0 8.29 5,093,542
Cost basis: 2008 Q4 614,420 0 4.90 3,010,658
$8.87 2009 Q1 704,214 89,794 6.17 4,345,000
Annualized Return: 2009 Q2 704,214 0 7.05 4,964,709
-30.0% 2009 Q3 704,214 0 7.91 5,570,333
Time Held: 2009 Q4 704,214 0 9.39 6,612,569
8.25 2010 Q1 704,214 0 9.88 6,957,634
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2010 Q2 704,214 0 10.69 7,528,048
-44.5% 2010 Q3 704,214 0 10.73 7,556,216
2010 Q4 1,180,972 476,758 11.37 13,427,652
2011 Q1 1,180,972 0 10.95 12,931,643
2011 Q2 1,180,972 0 10.76 12,707,259
14.6% 2011 Q3 5,904,863 4,723,891 8.69 51,313,259
2011 Q4 5,904,863 0 6.93 40,920,701
2012 Q1 5,904,863 0 7.07 41,747,381
2012 Q2 5,904,863 0 6.52 38,499,707
2012 Q3 5,904,863 0 6.82 40,271,166
2012 Q4 5,904,863 0 5.95 35,133,935
2013 Q1 5,904,863 0 4.52 26,689,981
2013 Q2 5,904,863 0 2.81 16,592,665
2013 Q3 5,904,863 0 1.84 10,864,948
2013 Q4 5,904,863 0 1.43 8,443,954
2014 Q1 5,904,863 0 1.06 6,259,155
2014 Q2 5,904,863 0 1.00 5,904,863
2014 Q3 5,904,863 0 1.37 8,089,662
2014 Q4 5,904,863 0 1.03 6,082,009
2015 Q1 5,904,863 0 1.05 6,200,106
2015 Q2 5,904,863 0 1.46 8,621,100
2015 Q3 5,904,863 0 1.38 8,148,711
2015 Q4 5,904,863 0 0.82 4,841,988
2016 Q1 5,904,863 0 0.50 2,952,432
2016 Q2 5,904,863 0 0.47 2,775,286
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
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American Railcar Industries 5.7% 2006 Q1 6,109,894 6,109,894 24.13 147,431,742
Sector: 2006 Q2 6,109,894 0 29.76 181,830,445
Industrials 2006 Q3 6,109,894 0 25.31 154,641,417
Cost basis: 2006 Q4 6,109,894 0 27.67 169,060,767
$21.66 2007 Q1 6,109,894 0 26.28 160,568,014
Annualized Return: 2007 Q2 6,109,894 0 32.97 201,443,205
6.0% 2007 Q3 6,109,894 0 24.98 152,625,152
Time Held: 2007 Q4 6,526,980 417,086 16.00 104,431,680
10.25 2008 Q1 6,526,980 0 18.33 119,639,543
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2008 Q2 6,526,980 0 17.94 117,094,021
0.3% 2008 Q3 6,526,980 0 16.07 104,888,569
2008 Q4 6,526,980 0 8.46 55,218,251
2009 Q1 11,564,145 5,037,165 7.88 91,125,463
2009 Q2 11,564,145 0 7.31 84,533,900
2009 Q3 11,564,145 0 8.62 99,682,930
2009 Q4 11,564,145 0 9.80 113,328,621
2010 Q1 11,564,145 0 9.72 112,403,489
2010 Q2 11,564,145 0 13.59 157,156,731
2010 Q3 11,564,145 0 11.28 130,443,556
2010 Q4 11,564,145 0 16.31 188,611,205
2011 Q1 11,564,145 0 19.24 222,494,150
2011 Q2 11,564,145 0 21.43 247,819,627
2011 Q3 11,810,598 246,453 16.78 198,181,834
2011 Q4 11,848,898 38,300 19.78 234,371,202
2012 Q1 11,848,898 0 24.73 293,023,248
2012 Q2 11,871,268 22,370 21.65 257,012,952
2012 Q3 11,871,268 0 26.30 312,214,348
2012 Q4 11,871,268 0 27.84 330,496,101
2013 Q1 11,871,268 0 37.58 446,122,251
2013 Q2 11,871,268 0 32.96 391,276,993
2013 Q3 11,871,268 0 32.66 387,715,613
2013 Q4 11,871,268 0 39.63 470,458,351
2014 Q1 11,871,268 0 54.51 647,102,819
2014 Q2 11,871,268 0 59.92 711,326,379
2014 Q3 11,871,268 0 69.21 821,610,458
2014 Q4 11,871,268 0 58.58 695,418,879
2015 Q1 11,871,268 0 49.75 590,595,583
2015 Q2 11,871,268 0 51.53 611,726,440
2015 Q3 11,871,268 0 39.96 474,375,869
2015 Q4 11,871,268 0 47.84 567,921,461
2016 Q1 11,871,268 0 41.00 486,721,988
2016 Q2 11,871,268 0 39.38 467,490,534
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
Hertz Global Holdings 1.5% 2014 Q3 38,800,000 38,800,000 28.56 1,108,128,000
Sector: 2014 Q4 51,922,405 13,122,405 22.33 1,159,427,304
Industrials 2015 Q1 51,922,405 0 22.26 1,155,792,735
Cost basis: 2015 Q2 51,922,405 0 20.48 1,063,370,854
$25.06 2015 Q3 51,922,405 0 17.54 910,718,984
Annualized Return: 2015 Q4 63,709,083 11,786,678 16.58 1,056,296,596
-40.3% 2016 Q1 63,709,083 0 9.70 617,978,105
Time Held: 2016 Q2 63,709,083 0 10.17 647,921,374
1.75
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-41.8%
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
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Manitowoc Company 2.9% 2014 Q4 4,492,631 4,492,631 4.19 18,824,124
Sector: 2015 Q1 10,582,660 6,090,029 4.32 45,717,091
Industrials 2015 Q2 10,582,660 0 4.23 44,764,652
Cost basis: 2015 Q3 10,582,660 0 3.56 37,674,270
$4.27 2015 Q4 10,582,660 0 3.24 34,287,818
Annualized Return: 2016 Q1 10,582,660 0 3.49 36,933,483
0.3% 2016 Q2 10,582,660 0 4.29 45,399,611
Time Held:
1.50
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-2.6%
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
Navistar International 2011 Q3 1,765,647 1,765,647 42.87 75,693,287
Sector: 15.3% 2011 Q4 7,251,426 5,485,779 38.08 276,134,302
Industrials 2012 Q1 7,251,426 0 42.01 304,632,406
Cost basis: 2012 Q2 8,167,903 916,477 28.88 235,889,039
$33.79 2012 Q3 10,250,500 2,082,597 23.81 244,064,405
Annualized Return: 2012 Q4 11,845,167 1,594,667 20.48 242,589,020
-19.4% 2013 Q1 11,845,167 0 28.91 342,443,778
Time Held: 2013 Q2 11,845,167 0 32.18 381,177,474
4.75 2013 Q3 13,309,735 1,464,568 33.70 448,538,070
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2013 Q4 13,309,735 0 38.17 508,032,585
-34.7% 2014 Q1 13,309,735 0 34.80 463,178,778
2014 Q2 14,337,524 1,027,789 35.28 505,827,847
2014 Q3 16,120,289 1,782,765 36.95 595,644,679
2014 Q4 16,272,524 152,235 33.47 544,641,378
2015 Q1 16,272,524 0 29.70 483,293,963
2015 Q2 16,272,524 0 26.29 427,804,656
2015 Q3 16,272,524 0 17.32 281,840,116
2015 Q4 16,272,524 0 11.57 188,273,103
2016 Q1 16,272,524 0 8.95 145,639,090
2016 Q2 16,272,524 0 12.11 197,060,266
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Mentor Graphics 2010 Q2 1,553,764 1,553,764 8.74 13,579,897
Sector: 2010 Q3 3,224,057 1,670,293 9.41 30,338,376
Information Technology 2010 Q4 3,224,057 0 10.91 35,174,462
Cost basis: 2011 Q1 3,224,057 0 14.04 45,265,760
$10.06 2011 Q2 3,224,057 0 13.36 43,073,402
Annualized Return: 12.2% 2011 Q3 16,120,289 12,896,232 10.30 166,038,977
12.5% 2011 Q4 16,120,289 0 11.33 182,642,874
Time Held: 2012 Q1 16,120,289 0 14.18 228,585,698
6.00 2012 Q2 16,120,289 0 13.85 223,266,003
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2012 Q3 16,120,289 0 15.37 247,768,842
0.3% 2012 Q4 16,120,289 0 15.17 244,544,784
2013 Q1 16,120,289 0 16.46 265,339,957
2013 Q2 16,120,289 0 17.87 288,069,564
2013 Q3 16,120,289 0 21.01 338,687,272
2013 Q4 16,120,289 0 22.14 356,903,198
2014 Q1 16,120,289 0 21.16 341,105,315
2014 Q2 16,120,289 0 20.72 334,012,388
2014 Q3 16,120,289 0 21.13 340,621,707
2014 Q4 16,120,289 0 20.68 333,367,577
2015 Q1 16,120,289 0 23.19 373,829,502
2015 Q2 16,120,289 0 25.38 409,132,935
2015 Q3 16,120,289 0 25.32 408,165,717
2015 Q4 16,120,289 0 20.27 326,758,258
2016 Q1 5,489,034 (10,631,255) 18.43 101,162,897
2016 Q2 5,489,034 0 20.38 111,866,513
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
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Nuance Communications 2013 Q1 3,812,000 3,812,000 20.23 77,116,760
Sector: 13.6% 2013 Q2 31,547,631 27,735,631 19.63 619,279,997
Information Technology 2013 Q3 52,437,750 20,890,119 19.09 1,001,036,648
Cost basis: 2013 Q4 60,784,623 8,346,873 15.32 931,220,424
$18.89 2014 Q1 60,784,623 0 15.60 948,240,119
Annualized Return: 2014 Q2 60,784,623 0 16.98 1,032,122,899
-0.3% 2014 Q3 60,784,623 0 17.14 1,041,848,438
Time Held: 2014 Q4 60,784,623 0 14.80 899,612,420
3.25 2015 Q1 60,784,623 0 13.89 844,298,413
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2015 Q2 60,784,623 0 16.38 995,652,125
-13.8% 2015 Q3 60,784,623 0 17.37 1,055,828,902
2015 Q4 60,784,623 0 19.39 1,178,613,840
2016 Q1 30,068,833 (30,715,790) 18.52 556,874,787
2016 Q2 30,068,833 0 18.73 563,189,242
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
eBay 10.3% 2014 Q1 27,803,015 27,803,015 23.14 643,361,767
Sector: 2014 Q2 30,803,015 3,000,000 21.69 668,117,395
Information Technology 2014 Q3 45,825,684 15,022,669 22.36 1,024,662,294
Cost basis: 2014 Q4 46,271,370 445,686 22.52 1,042,031,252
$22.79 2015 Q1 46,271,370 0 23.87 1,104,497,602
Annualized Return: 2015 Q2 46,271,370 0 25.03 1,158,172,391
12.0% 2015 Q3 0 0 27.02 0
Time Held:
1.50
Excess Return vs. Sector:
1.7%
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
PayPal 9.6% 2015 Q3 46,271,370 46,271,370 36.52 1,689,830,432
Sector: 2015 Q4 46,271,370 0 35.33 1,634,767,502
Information Technology 2016 Q1 46,271,370 0 35.92 1,662,067,610
Cost basis: 2016 Q2 46,271,370 0 39.19 1,813,374,990
$36.52
Annualized Return:
9.9%
Time Held:
0.75
Excess Return vs. Sector:
0.2%
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
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Appendix F – Icahn Associates Corporation Activist Scorecard 
 
Fund:
Current Activist Positions: 21 -7.9%
Outperform: 5 4.8% 25.2% 1.2%
Underperform: 13 -15.6% 59.0% -9.2%
Neutral*: 3 0.2% 15.8% 0.0%
*within 1% of Sector Return
Activist Position Scorecard
Icahn Associates Corporation
Number of 
Positions
Weigthed 
Average Return
Current 
Weight
Total Weighted 
Activist Return
Freeport Mcmoran -9.7% 2015 Q3 100,000,000 100,000,000 11.29 1,129,000,000
Sector: 2015 Q4 104,000,000 4,000,000 9.21 957,840,000
Materials 2016 Q1 104,000,000 0 6.65 691,600,000
Cost basis: 2016 Q2 104,000,000 0 9.81 1,020,240,000
$11.21
Annualized Return:
-16.3%
Time Held:
0.75
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-6.6%
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Xerox 26.1% 2015 Q4 86,436,172 86,436,172 9.99 863,497,358
Sector: 2016 Q1 92,377,043 5,940,871 9.60 886,819,613
Information Technology 2016 Q2 92,377,043 0 11.07 1,022,613,866
Cost basis:
$9.97
Annualized Return:
23.3%
Time Held:
0.50
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-2.8%
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
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Appendix G – JANA Partners Activist Positions 
 
 
 
 
 
Conagra Foods 8.9% 2015 Q2 11,537,414 11,537,414 38.66 446,036,425
Sector: 2015 Q3 30,569,414 19,032,000 42.09 1,286,666,635
Consumer Staples 2015 Q4 28,629,613 (1,939,801) 40.68 1,164,652,657
Cost basis: 2016 Q1 28,629,613 0 41.47 1,187,270,051
$40.79 2016 Q2 28,629,613 0 45.45 1,301,215,911
Annualized Return:
11.4%
Time Held:
1.00
Excess Return vs. Sector:
2.6%
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Computer Sciences 2014 Q4 2,754,027 2,754,027 34.12 93,967,401
Sector: 5.8% 2015 Q1 7,467,874 4,713,847 37.03 276,535,374
Information Technology 2015 Q2 8,038,030 570,156 37.81 303,917,914
Cost basis: 2015 Q3 7,332,386 (705,644) 36.29 266,092,288
$36.09 2015 Q4 4,768,083 (2,564,303) 33.85 161,399,610
Annualized Return: 2016 Q1 4,768,083 0 29.69 141,564,384
-4.0% 2016 Q2 4,768,083 0 33.96 161,924,099
Time Held:
1.50
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-9.8%
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Qualcomm 2014 Q4 4,400,705 4,400,705 69.35 305,188,892
Sector: 5.8% 2015 Q1 28,537,985 24,137,280 67.22 1,918,323,352
Information Technology 2015 Q2 28,819,654 281,669 66.01 1,902,385,361
Cost basis: 2015 Q3 28,550,816 (268,838) 57.98 1,655,376,312
$67.54 2015 Q4 9,212,133 (19,338,683) 51.55 474,885,456
Annualized Return: 2016 Q1 9,212,133 0 48.05 442,642,991
-17.6% 2016 Q2 9,212,133 0 50.51 465,304,838
Time Held:
1.50
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-23.4%
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
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Appendix H – JANA Partners Activist Scorecard 
 
 
 
 
Appendix I – Pershing Square Capital Management Activist Positions 
 
Team Health Holdings -21.6% 2016 Q1 5,890,368 5,890,368 40.46 238,324,289
Sector: 2016 Q2 5,890,368 0 41.61 245,098,212
Health Care
Cost basis:
$40.46
Annualized Return:
11.9%
Time Held:
0.25
Excess Return vs. Sector:
33.5%
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
Fund:
Current Activist Positions: 4 -0.4%
Outperform: 2 1.2% 67.3% 0.8%
Underperform: 2 -3.8% 32.7% -1.2%
Neutral*: 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
*within 1% of Sector Return
Activist Position Scorecard
JANA Partners
Number of 
Positions
Weigthed 
Average Return
Current 
Weight
Total Weighted 
Activist Return
Mondelez International 15.6% 2015 Q3 43,366,342 43,366,342 42.78 1,855,212,111
Sector: 2015 Q4 43,366,342 0 44.22 1,917,659,643
Consumer Staples 2016 Q1 22,942,225 (20,424,117) 40.35 925,718,779
Cost basis: 2016 Q2 22,942,225 0 40.86 937,419,314
$42.78
Annualized Return:
-5.9%
Time Held:
0.75
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-21.5%
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume 
Weighted 
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Valeant Pharmaceuticals -0.7% 2015 Q1 19,473,933 19,473,933 222.79 4,338,597,533
Sector: 2015 Q2 19,473,933 0 273.03 5,316,967,927
Health Care 2015 Q3 19,473,933 0 297.83 5,799,921,465
Cost basis: 2015 Q4 16,591,122 (2,882,811) 146.57 2,431,760,752
$189.62 2016 Q1 21,591,122 5,000,000 79.59 1,718,437,400
Annualized Return: 2016 Q2 21,591,122 0 36.61 790,450,976
-73.2%
Time Held:
1.25
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-72.5%
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume 
Weighted 
Zoetis 2014 Q3 5,536,862 5,536,862 33.87 187,533,516
Sector: 4.0% 2014 Q4 41,569,646 36,032,784 40.33 1,676,503,823
Health Care 2015 Q1 41,823,145 253,499 44.76 1,872,003,970
Cost basis: 2015 Q2 41,823,145 0 47.52 1,987,435,850
$39.50 2015 Q3 41,823,145 0 45.71 1,911,735,958
Annualized Return: 2015 Q4 41,823,145 0 44.42 1,857,784,101
7.5% 2016 Q1 41,823,145 0 42.19 1,764,518,488
Time Held: 2016 Q2 41,823,145 0 44.81 1,874,095,127
1.75
Excess Return vs. Sector:
3.5%
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume 
Weighted 
Position Value
Howard Hughes 8.5% 2010 Q4 3,568,017 3,568,017 44.16 157,563,631
Sector: 2011 Q1 3,568,017 0 58.77 209,692,359
Financials 2011 Q2 3,568,017 0 67.63 241,304,990
Cost basis: 2011 Q3 3,568,017 0 52.00 185,536,884
$44.16 2011 Q4 3,568,017 0 44.58 159,062,198
Annualized Return: 2012 Q1 3,568,017 0 55.23 197,061,579
16.5% 2012 Q2 3,568,017 0 61.91 220,895,932
Time Held: 2012 Q3 3,568,017 0 65.55 233,883,514
5.50 2012 Q4 3,568,017 0 72.11 257,289,706
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2013 Q1 3,568,017 0 76.76 273,880,985
7.9% 2013 Q2 3,568,017 0 100.24 357,658,024
2013 Q3 3,568,017 0 109.31 390,019,938
2013 Q4 3,568,017 0 113.48 404,898,569
2014 Q1 3,568,017 0 132.63 473,226,095
2014 Q2 3,568,017 0 145.81 520,252,559
2014 Q3 3,568,017 0 153.29 546,941,326
2014 Q4 3,568,017 0 138.11 492,778,828
2015 Q1 3,568,017 0 136.72 487,819,284
2015 Q2 3,568,017 0 149.07 531,884,294
2015 Q3 3,568,017 0 128.39 458,097,703
2015 Q4 3,568,017 0 120.54 430,088,769
2016 Q1 3,568,017 0 96.36 343,814,118
2016 Q2 3,568,017 0 102.18 364,579,977
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume 
Weighted 
Position Value
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Appendix J – Pershing Square Capital Management Activist Scorecard 
Air Products & Chemicals 4.6% 2013 Q2 10,095,708 10,095,708 84.96 857,731,352
Sector: 2013 Q3 20,545,284 10,449,576 96.04 1,973,169,075
Materials 2013 Q4 20,549,076 3,792 102.33 2,102,786,947
Cost basis: 2014 Q1 20,549,076 0 108.87 2,237,177,904
$90.60 2014 Q2 20,549,076 0 116.59 2,395,816,771
Annualized Return 2014 Q3 20,549,076 0 127.10 2,611,787,560
16.9% 2014 Q4 20,549,076 0 129.31 2,657,201,018
Time Held: 2015 Q1 20,549,076 0 144.35 2,966,259,121
3.00 2015 Q2 20,549,076 0 143.65 2,951,874,767
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2015 Q3 20,549,076 0 134.85 2,771,042,899
12.3% 2015 Q4 20,549,076 0 133.88 2,751,110,295
2016 Q1 7,601,140 (12,947,936) 129.91 987,464,097
2016 Q2 7,601,140 0 144.64 1,099,428,890
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume 
Weighted 
Position Value
Candian Pacific Railway 2011 Q3 4,040,235 4,040,235 52.47 211,991,130
Sector: 15.3% 2011 Q4 24,154,408 20,114,173 57.54 1,389,844,636
Industrials 2012 Q1 24,159,888 5,480 70.31 1,698,681,725
Cost basis: 2012 Q2 24,159,888 0 72.25 1,745,551,908
$56.72 2012 Q3 24,159,888 0 77.41 1,870,216,930
Annualized Return: 2012 Q4 24,159,888 0 89.99 2,174,148,321
26.1% 2013 Q1 24,159,888 0 114.88 2,775,487,933
Time Held: 2013 Q2 24,159,888 0 125.24 3,025,784,373
4.75 2013 Q3 23,125,192 (1,034,696) 125.75 2,907,992,894
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2013 Q4 17,159,888 (5,965,304) 146.46 2,513,237,196
10.8% 2014 Q1 17,159,888 0 164.60 2,824,517,565
2014 Q2 13,938,302 (3,221,586) 176.85 2,464,988,709
2014 Q3 13,940,890 2,588 210.62 2,936,230,252
2014 Q4 13,940,890 0 220.89 3,079,403,192
2015 Q1 13,940,890 0 226.76 3,161,236,216
2015 Q2 13,940,890 0 214.85 2,995,200,217
2015 Q3 13,940,890 0 195.60 2,726,838,084
2015 Q4 13,940,890 0 185.49 2,585,895,686
2016 Q1 13,940,890 0 164.54 2,293,834,041
2016 Q2 13,940,890 0 170.90 2,382,498,101
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume 
Weighted 
Fund:
Current Activist Positions: 6 -3.9%
Outperform: 4 8.5% 76.8% 6.5%
Underperform: 2 -44.8% 23.2% -10.4%
Neutral*: 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
*within 1% of Sector Return
Activist Position Scorecard
Pershing Square Capital Management
Number of 
Positions
Weigthed 
Average Return
Current 
Weight
Total Weighted 
Activist Return
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Appendix K – Third Point LLC Activist Positions 
 
 
 
Green Brick Partners 2012 Q2 1,008,432 729,492 5.16 5,203,509
Sector: 2012 Q3 1,043,123 34,691 4.34 4,527,154
Consumer Discretionary 2012 Q4 1,043,123 0 3.88 4,047,317
Cost basis: 2013 Q1 1,043,123 0 3.47 3,619,637
$10.05 2013 Q2 1,043,123 0 2.79 2,910,313
Annualized Return: 2013 Q3 1,043,123 0 2.47 2,576,514
-7.1% 2013 Q4 1,043,123 0 1.37 1,429,079
Time Held: 2014 Q1 1,043,123 0 2.9 3,025,057
4.00 2014 Q2 1,043,123 0 4.73 4,933,972
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2014 Q3 1,043,126 3 6.18 6,446,519
-19.2% 12.0% 2014 Q4 5,242,124 4,198,998 7.12 37,323,923
2015 Q1 5,242,124 0 7.71 40,416,776
2015 Q2 8,083,022 2,840,898 9.91 80,102,748
2015 Q3 8,083,022 0 12.07 97,562,076
2015 Q4 8,083,022 0 8.5 68,705,687
2016 Q1 8,083,022 0 5.99 48,417,302
2016 Q2 8,083,022 0 7.48 60,461,005
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Sotheby's 2013 Q1 500,000 500,000 36.27 18,135,000
Sector: 2013 Q2 2,500,000 2,000,000 35.69 89,225,000
Consumer Discretionary 13.1% 2013 Q3 6,150,000 3,650,000 44.04 270,846,000
Cost basis: 2013 Q4 6,350,000 200,000 50.29 319,341,500
$41.22 2014 Q1 6,650,000 300,000 46.68 310,422,000
Annualized Return: 2014 Q2 6,650,000 0 40.05 266,332,500
-12.8% 2014 Q3 6,650,000 0 38.69 257,288,500
Time Held: 2014 Q4 6,650,000 0 38.86 258,419,000
3.25 2015 Q1 6,650,000 0 42.03 279,499,500
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2015 Q2 6,650,000 0 43.72 290,738,000
-25.9% 2015 Q3 6,650,000 0 37.13 246,914,500
2015 Q4 6,650,000 0 30.36 201,894,000
2016 Q1 6,660,925 10,925 23.49 156,465,128
2016 Q2 6,660,925 0 26.39 175,781,811
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
Baxter International 2015 Q2 3,950,000 3,950,000 36.91 145,794,500
Sector: -11.7% 2015 Q3 53,850,000 49,900,000 38.20 2,057,070,000
Health Care 2015 Q4 53,850,000 0 35.94 1,935,369,000
Cost basis: 2016 Q1 53,850,000 0 37.62 2,025,837,000
$38.11 2016 Q2 53,850,000 0 41.39 2,228,851,500
Annualized Return:
8.6%
Time Held:
1.00
Excess Return vs. Sector:
20.3%
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
 Beck 71 
 Appendix L – Third Point LLC Activist Scorecard 
 
 
 Appendix M – Trian Fund Management Activist Positions 
 
Fund:
Current Activist Positions: 3 16.0%
Outperform: 1 20.3% 90.4% 18.3%
Underperform: 2 -24.2% 9.6% -2.3%
Neutral*: 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
*within 1% of Sector Return
Activist Position Scorecard
Third Point LLC
Number of 
Positions
Weigthed 
Average Return
Current 
Weight
Total Weighted 
Activist Return
Wendy's 14.1% 2008 Q3 27,227,751 27,227,751 4.76 129,604,095
Sector: 2008 Q4 76,623,145 49,395,394 3.37 258,219,999
Consumer Discretionary 2009 Q1 76,623,145 0 4.33 331,778,218
Cost basis: 2009 Q2 76,623,145 0 3.86 295,765,340
$3.92 2009 Q3 76,623,145 0 4.21 322,583,440
Annualized Return: 2009 Q4 76,623,145 0 3.82 292,700,414
14.1% 2010 Q1 76,623,145 0 4.15 317,986,052
Time Held: 2010 Q2 76,623,145 0 4.16 318,752,283
7.50 2010 Q3 76,623,145 0 3.77 288,869,257
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2010 Q4 76,623,145 0 4.21 322,583,440
0.0% 2011 Q1 76,623,145 0 4.34 332,544,449
2011 Q2 76,623,145 0 4.39 336,375,607
2011 Q3 76,623,145 0 4.53 347,102,847
2011 Q4 76,623,145 0 4.55 348,635,310
2012 Q1 83,000,245 6,377,100 4.58 380,141,122
2012 Q2 83,000,245 0 4.27 354,411,046
2012 Q3 83,000,245 0 4.12 341,961,009
2012 Q4 83,000,245 0 4.12 341,961,009
2013 Q1 83,000,245 0 4.95 410,851,213
2013 Q2 83,000,245 0 5.41 449,031,325
2013 Q3 83,000,245 0 7.16 594,281,754
2013 Q4 83,000,245 0 8.09 671,471,982
2014 Q1 64,800,245 (18,200,000) 8.73 565,706,139
2014 Q2 64,800,245 0 8.06 522,289,975
2014 Q3 64,800,245 0 7.89 511,273,933
2014 Q4 64,800,245 0 8.08 523,585,980
2015 Q1 64,800,245 0 10.35 670,682,536
2015 Q2 54,024,581 (10,775,664) 10.87 587,247,195
2015 Q3 40,792,537 (13,232,044) 9.64 393,240,057
2015 Q4 40,792,537 0 9.74 397,319,310
2016 Q1 40,792,537 0 9.87 402,622,340
2016 Q2 40,792,537 0 10.93 445,862,429
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
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Mondelez International 13.8% 2013 Q1 40,300,550 40,300,550 26.43 1,065,143,537
Sector: 2013 Q2 40,946,850 646,300 28.99 1,187,049,182
Consumer Staples 2013 Q3 40,946,850 0 29.71 1,216,530,914
Cost basis: 2013 Q4 41,473,078 526,228 31.78 1,318,014,419
$28.38 2014 Q1 41,737,993 264,915 33.02 1,378,188,529
Annualized Return: 2014 Q2 41,741,854 3,861 35.34 1,475,157,120
11.9% 2014 Q3 41,741,854 0 35.33 1,474,739,702
Time Held: 2014 Q4 46,299,025 4,557,171 35.29 1,633,892,592
3.25 2015 Q1 48,024,117 1,725,092 35.36 1,698,132,777
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2015 Q2 48,028,053 3,936 38.51 1,849,560,321
-1.9% 2015 Q3 48,028,087 34 42.78 2,054,641,562
2015 Q4 48,028,124 37 44.22 2,123,803,643
2016 Q1 50,658,195 2,630,071 40.35 2,044,058,168
2016 Q2 50,658,195 0 40.86 2,069,893,848
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
Sysco 2015 Q2 10,218,418 10,218,418 36.32 371,132,942
Sector: 15.6% 2015 Q3 41,411,938 31,193,520 37.72 1,562,058,301
Consumer Staples 2015 Q4 42,685,607 1,273,669 40.31 1,720,656,818
Cost basis: 2016 Q1 43,261,399 575,792 42.52 1,839,474,685
$37.53 2016 Q2 43,261,399 0 46.89 2,028,526,999
Annualized Return:
24.9%
Time Held:
1.00
Excess Return vs. Sector:
9.4%
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
PepsiCo 13.8% 2013 Q1 12,030,846 12,030,846 67.64 813,766,423
Sector: 2013 Q2 12,270,046 239,200 75.13 921,848,556
Consumer Staples 2013 Q3 12,270,046 0 76.27 935,836,408
Cost basis: 2013 Q4 12,348,546 78,500 77.35 955,160,033
$74.08 2014 Q1 12,421,546 73,000 76.01 944,161,711
Annualized Return: 2014 Q2 12,938,653 517,107 81.54 1,055,017,766
10.8% 2014 Q3 17,865,831 4,927,178 87.10 1,556,113,880
Time Held: 2014 Q4 17,865,831 0 91.69 1,638,118,044
3.25 2015 Q1 18,316,211 450,380 93.52 1,712,932,053
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2015 Q2 18,316,211 0 93.02 1,703,773,947
-3.0% 2015 Q3 18,316,211 0 93.00 1,703,407,623
2015 Q4 18,316,211 0 98.41 1,802,498,325
2016 Q1 18,316,211 0 98.04 1,795,721,326
2016 Q2 18,316,211 0 103.24 1,890,965,624
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
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BNY Mellon 2014 Q1 9,330,230 9,330,230 31.98 298,380,755
Sector: 2014 Q2 19,110,843 9,780,613 33.52 640,595,457
Financials -0.6% 2014 Q3 28,897,639 9,786,796 37.85 1,093,775,636
Cost basis: 2014 Q4 28,897,639 0 37.96 1,096,954,376
34.85 2015 Q1 30,225,639 1,328,000 38.13 1,152,503,615
Annualized Return: 2015 Q2 30,225,639 0 42.20 1,275,521,966
2.5% 2015 Q3 30,228,703 3,064 41.00 1,239,376,823
Time Held: 2015 Q4 30,935,516 706,813 41.70 1,290,011,017
2.25 2016 Q1 31,823,629 888,113 36.04 1,146,923,589
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2016 Q2 31,823,629 0 36.84 1,172,382,492
3.1%
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Legg Mason 2009 Q1 745,846 745,846 14.21 10,598,472
Sector: 2009 Q2 3,007,546 2,261,700 19.12 57,504,280
Financials 9.8% 2009 Q3 6,946,756 3,939,210 25.25 175,405,589
Cost basis: 2009 Q4 9,608,586 2,661,830 27.69 266,061,746
$24.73 2010 Q1 9,934,086 325,500 25.76 255,902,055
Annualized Return: 2010 Q2 11,078,686 1,144,600 28.76 318,623,009
4.6% 2010 Q3 11,078,686 0 26.11 289,264,491
Time Held: 2010 Q4 11,078,686 0 30.90 342,331,397
7.25 2011 Q1 11,257,370 178,684 32.43 365,076,509
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2011 Q2 11,257,370 0 31.64 356,183,187
-5.2% 2011 Q3 14,702,269 3,444,899 25.94 381,376,858
2011 Q4 14,702,269 0 23.98 352,560,411
2012 Q1 14,702,269 0 25.32 372,261,451
2012 Q2 14,702,269 0 23.56 346,385,458
2012 Q3 12,884,337 (1,817,932) 24.15 311,156,739
2012 Q4 12,884,337 0 23.96 308,708,715
2013 Q1 12,884,337 0 27.07 348,779,003
2013 Q2 12,884,337 0 31.29 403,150,905
2013 Q3 12,886,493 2,156 32.10 413,656,425
2013 Q4 12,886,493 0 37.57 484,145,542
2014 Q1 12,886,493 0 42.89 552,701,685
2014 Q2 12,886,493 0 46.23 595,742,571
2014 Q3 12,887,964 1,471 48.20 621,199,865
2014 Q4 12,887,964 0 51.29 661,023,674
2015 Q1 12,887,964 0 54.71 705,100,510
2015 Q2 11,039,896 (1,848,068) 52.83 583,237,706
2015 Q3 11,039,896 0 45.41 501,321,677
2015 Q4 11,039,896 0 42.33 467,318,798
2016 Q1 11,039,896 0 31.05 342,788,771
2016 Q2 11,039,896 0 34.37 379,441,226
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
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Appendix N – Trian Fund Management Activist Scorecard 
 
Pentair PLC -0.5% 2015 Q2 6,788,791 6,788,791 62.02 421,040,818
Sector: 2015 Q3 13,005,377 6,216,586 57.38 746,248,532
Industrials 2015 Q4 13,681,877 676,500 53.87 737,042,714
Cost basis: 2016 Q1 14,335,888 654,011 47.33 678,517,579
$58.95 2016 Q2 14,335,888 0 53.43 765,966,496
Annualized Return:
-9.4%
Time Held:
1.00
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-8.8%
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Fund:
Current Activist Positions: 8 1.5%
Outperform: 3 7.5% 44.6% 3.4%
Underperform: 4 -3.6% 50.9% -1.8%
Neutral*: 1 0.0% 4.4% 0.0%
*within 1% of Sector Return
Activist Position Scorecard
Trian Fund Management
Number of 
Positions
Weigthed 
Average Return
Current 
Weight
Total Weighted 
Activist Return
DuPont 2013 Q2 5,778,403 5,778,403 46.50 268,695,740
Sector: 2013 Q3 5,778,403 0 50.98 294,582,985
Materials 2013 Q4 5,778,403 0 54.18 313,073,875
Cost basis: 2014 Q1 6,141,364 362,961 57.55 353,435,498
$59.16 2014 Q2 6,141,364 0 60.97 374,438,963
Annualized Return: 2014 Q3 6,959,877 818,513 61.02 424,691,695
2.2% -6.5% 2014 Q4 24,313,084 17,353,207 63.66 1,547,770,927
Time Held: 2015 Q1 24,563,084 250,000 69.53 1,707,871,231
3.00 2015 Q2 24,563,084 0 65.69 1,613,548,988
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2015 Q3 25,801,884 1,238,800 52.31 1,349,696,552
8.7% 2015 Q4 20,224,075 (5,577,809) 62.82 1,270,476,392
2016 Q1 20,224,075 0 59.31 1,199,489,888
2016 Q2 20,224,075 0 63.14 1,276,948,096
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
 Beck 75 
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Baker Hughes -22.4% 2014 Q4 14,997,500 14,997,500 57.24 858,456,900
Sector: 2015 Q1 23,246,700 8,249,200 59.08 1,373,415,036
Energy 2015 Q2 23,246,700 0 64.76 1,505,456,292
Cost basis: 2015 Q3 23,246,700 0 55.07 1,280,195,769
$57.89 2015 Q4 23,246,700 0 50.37 1,170,936,279
Annualized Return: 2016 Q1 23,246,700 0 43.13 1,002,630,171
-17.7% 2016 Q2 23,246,700 0 43.22 1,004,722,374
Time Held:
1.50
Excess Return vs. Sector:
4.7%
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
Twenty-First Century Fox 2014 Q2 2,663,083 2,663,083 32.25 85,884,427
Sector: 10.2% 2014 Q3 25,200,000 22,536,917 32.65 822,780,000
Consumer Discretionary 2014 Q4 30,300,000 5,100,000 33.50 1,015,050,000
Cost basis: 2015 Q1 31,385,000 1,085,000 32.98 1,035,077,300
$32.46 2015 Q2 44,581,334 13,196,334 32.59 1,452,905,675
Annualized Return: 2015 Q3 47,326,334 2,745,000 28.28 1,338,388,726
-5.8% 2015 Q4 47,326,334 0 29.12 1,378,142,846
Time Held: 2016 Q1 47,326,334 0 26.50 1,254,147,851
2.00 2016 Q2 47,326,334 0 28.82 1,363,944,946
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-16.0%
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
Halliburton -22.4% 2014 Q4 20,895,000 20,895,000 45.99 960,961,050
Sector: 2015 Q1 33,756,760 12,861,760 40.48 1,366,473,645
Energy 2015 Q2 37,518,260 3,761,500 45.38 1,702,578,639
Cost basis: 2015 Q3 37,149,560 (368,700) 38.77 1,440,288,441
$44.04 2015 Q4 16,504,295 (20,645,265) 37.40 617,260,633
Annualized Return: 2016 Q1 16,504,295 0 32.08 529,457,784
-14.2% 2016 Q2 16,504,295 0 35.01 577,815,368
Time Held:
1.50
Excess Return vs. Sector:
8.3%
Position Value
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Information
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Valeant Pharmaceuticals 16.5% 2010 Q3 26,959,901 26,959,901 22.81 614,955,342
Sector: 2010 Q4 26,959,901 0 26.99 727,647,728
Health Care 2011 Q1 19,593,482 (7,366,419) 39.68 777,469,366
Cost basis: 2011 Q2 15,095,302 (4,498,180) 51.55 778,162,818
$32.95 2011 Q3 15,095,302 0 43.42 655,438,013
Annualized Return: 2011 Q4 15,095,302 0 41.00 618,907,382
-2.7% 2012 Q1 15,095,302 0 50.39 760,652,268
Time Held: 2012 Q2 17,559,302 2,464,000 49.77 873,926,461
5.75 2012 Q3 17,559,302 0 51.83 910,098,623
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2012 Q4 17,559,302 0 56.81 997,543,947
-19.2% 2013 Q1 17,559,302 0 66.88 1,174,366,118
2013 Q2 18,923,877 1,364,575 81.21 1,536,808,051
2013 Q3 18,923,877 0 97.12 1,837,886,934
2013 Q4 18,923,877 0 109.24 2,067,244,323
2014 Q1 18,923,877 0 136.35 2,580,270,629
2014 Q2 18,923,877 0 127.59 2,414,497,466
2014 Q3 18,923,877 0 118.53 2,243,047,141
2014 Q4 19,383,877 460,000 132.53 2,568,945,219
2015 Q1 19,383,877 0 183.57 3,558,298,301
2015 Q2 14,994,261 (4,389,616) 221.14 3,315,830,878
2015 Q3 14,994,261 0 215.71 3,234,412,040
2015 Q4 14,994,261 0 104.27 1,563,451,594
2016 Q1 14,994,261 0 52.48 786,898,817
2016 Q2 14,994,261 0 28.11 421,488,677
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
MSCI 11.1% 2012 Q4 6,159,213 6,159,213 26.92 165,806,014
Sector: 2013 Q1 6,159,213 0 32.51 200,236,015
Financials 2013 Q2 6,200,622 41,409 33.13 205,426,607
Cost basis: 2013 Q3 7,394,017 1,193,395 36.77 271,878,005
$31.36 2013 Q4 7,454,117 60,100 41.02 305,767,879
Annualized Return: 2014 Q1 8,133,117 679,000 42.55 346,064,128
27.9% 2014 Q2 9,341,288 1,208,171 41.77 390,185,600
Time Held: 2014 Q3 9,308,960 (32,328) 45.63 424,767,845
3.50 2014 Q4 9,308,960 0 45.95 427,746,712
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2015 Q1 9,308,960 0 54.43 506,686,693
16.9% 2015 Q2 9,308,960 0 61.22 569,894,531
2015 Q3 9,309,311 351 61.99 577,084,189
2015 Q4 6,327,311 (2,982,000) 66.52 420,892,728
2016 Q1 4,060,900 (2,266,411) 69.07 280,486,363
2016 Q2 4,060,900 0 74.23 301,440,607
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
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Armstrong World Industries 3.0% 2014 Q2 2,700,000 2,700,000 54.07 145,989,000
Sector: 2014 Q3 9,200,000 6,500,000 54.38 500,296,000
Industrials 2014 Q4 9,200,000 0 49.06 451,352,000
Cost basis: 2015 Q1 9,200,000 0 53.94 496,248,000
$54.29 2015 Q2 9,200,000 0 55.66 512,072,000
Annualized Return: 2015 Q3 9,200,000 0 54.47 501,124,000
-5.9% 2015 Q4 9,200,000 0 48.56 446,752,000
Time Held: 2016 Q1 9,200,000 0 40.38 371,496,000
2.00 2016 Q2 9,200,000 0 48.08 442,336,000
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-8.8%
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
Rolls Royce 3.5% 2015 Q3 100,000,000 100,000,000 7.54 754,000,000
Sector: 2015 Q4 184,000,000 84,000,000 6.07 1,116,880,000
Industrials 2016 Q1 199,106,254 15,106,254 6.09 1,212,557,087
Cost basis: 2016 Q2 199,106,254 0 6.64 1,322,065,527
£6.81
Annualized Return: in USD 1,890,553,703
-3.3%
Time Held:
0.75
Excess Return vs. Sector:
-6.8%
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price (GBp)
Allison Transmission 2013 Q3 4,625,204 4,625,204 21.95 101,523,228
Sector: 7.4% 2013 Q4 18,025,204 13,400,000 24.75 446,123,799
Industrials 2014 Q1 18,025,204 0 27.92 503,263,696
Cost basis: 2014 Q2 18,025,204 0 29.20 526,335,957
$24.40 2014 Q3 18,025,204 0 29.40 529,940,998
Annualized Return: 2014 Q4 19,125,204 1,100,000 30.41 581,597,454
3.4% 2015 Q1 19,125,204 0 31.19 596,515,113
Time Held: 2015 Q2 19,125,204 0 30.34 580,258,689
2.75 2015 Q3 19,125,204 0 28.12 537,800,736
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2015 Q4 19,125,204 0 27.05 517,336,768
-4.0% 2016 Q1 19,125,204 0 23.98 458,622,392
2016 Q2 19,125,204 0 26.78 512,172,963
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
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Microsoft 2013 Q1 33,353,513 33,353,513 25.34 845,178,019
Sector: 13.6% 2013 Q2 57,750,000 24,396,487 29.99 1,731,922,500
Information Technology 2013 Q3 66,865,530 9,115,530 30.52 2,040,735,976
Cost basis: 2013 Q4 66,865,530 0 34.02 2,274,765,331
$28.81 2014 Q1 71,285,530 4,420,000 35.49 2,529,923,460
Annualized Return: 2014 Q2 74,236,642 2,951,112 38.41 2,851,429,419
22.2% 2014 Q3 74,237,469 827 42.97 3,189,984,043
Time Held: 2014 Q4 74,238,243 774 44.93 3,335,524,258
3.25 2015 Q1 75,271,429 1,033,186 41.90 3,153,872,875
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2015 Q2 75,271,429 0 44.71 3,365,385,591
8.6% 2015 Q3 75,273,091 1,662 43.89 3,303,735,964
2015 Q4 56,623,770 (18,649,321) 52.20 2,955,760,794
2016 Q1 56,623,770 0 52.04 2,946,700,991
2016 Q2 56,623,770 0 55.26 3,129,029,530
Position Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
Position Value
Adobe Systems 2011 Q1 625,900 625,900 33.20 20,779,880
Sector: 2011 Q2 4,709,406 4,083,506 32.98 155,316,210
Information Technology 12.2% 2011 Q3 16,717,956 12,008,550 25.95 433,830,958
Cost basis: 2011 Q4 24,620,556 7,902,600 27.41 674,849,440
$28.71 2012 Q1 27,353,362 2,732,806 32.08 877,495,853
Annualized Return: 2012 Q2 31,303,362 3,950,000 32.22 1,008,594,324
25.6% 2012 Q3 31,303,362 0 32.23 1,008,907,357
Time Held: 2012 Q4 31,303,362 0 34.71 1,086,539,695
5.25 2013 Q1 31,303,362 0 39.69 1,242,430,438
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2013 Q2 31,303,362 0 44.46 1,391,747,475
13.4% 2013 Q3 31,303,362 0 48.35 1,513,517,553
2013 Q4 25,310,116 (5,993,246) 55.17 1,396,359,100
2014 Q1 25,310,116 0 64.50 1,632,502,482
2014 Q2 24,560,116 (750,000) 64.36 1,580,689,066
2014 Q3 23,860,116 (700,000) 70.32 1,677,843,357
2014 Q4 16,006,753 (7,853,363) 69.86 1,118,231,765
2015 Q1 16,006,753 0 74.68 1,195,384,314
2015 Q2 15,703,739 (303,014) 78.53 1,233,214,624
2015 Q3 14,010,739 (1,693,000) 80.84 1,132,628,141
2015 Q4 14,010,739 0 88.34 1,237,708,683
2016 Q1 6,000 (14,004,739) 85.95 515,700
2016 Q2 6,000 0 94.93 569,580
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
 Beck 79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix P – ValueAct Capital Management Activist Scorecard 
 
 
 
Fund:
Current Activist Positions: 11 0.9%
Outperform: 6 8.0% 61.7% 4.9%
Underperform: 5 -10.5% 38.3% -4.0%
Neutral*: 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
*within 1% of Sector Return
Activist Position Scorecard
ValueAct Capital Management
Number of 
Positions
Weigthed 
Average Return
Current 
Weight
Total Weighted 
Activist Return
Motorola Solutions 2011 Q1 3,990,500 3,990,500 36.00 143,658,000
Sector: 11.2% 2011 Q2 20,537,900 16,547,400 41.35 849,242,165
Information Technology 2011 Q3 24,001,000 3,463,100 38.54 924,998,540
Cost basis: 2011 Q4 24,001,000 0 41.54 997,001,540
$40.86 2012 Q1 28,971,500 4,970,500 44.74 1,296,184,910
Annualized Return: 2012 Q2 28,971,500 0 45.11 1,306,904,365
12.6% 2012 Q3 28,907,623 (63,877) 44.40 1,283,498,461
Time Held: 2012 Q4 28,907,623 0 49.34 1,426,302,119
5.25 2013 Q1 28,907,623 0 56.24 1,625,764,718
Excess Return vs. Sector: 2013 Q2 28,907,623 0 54.44 1,573,730,996
1.4% 2013 Q3 28,907,623 0 54.20 1,566,793,167
2013 Q4 28,907,623 0 60.09 1,737,059,066
2014 Q1 28,907,623 0 62.38 1,803,257,523
2014 Q2 28,907,623 0 62.90 1,818,289,487
2014 Q3 28,907,623 0 59.83 1,729,543,084
2014 Q4 17,588,576 (11,319,047) 61.59 1,083,280,396
2015 Q1 17,588,576 0 64.41 1,132,880,180
2015 Q2 17,588,576 0 58.93 1,036,494,784
2015 Q3 17,588,576 0 63.54 1,117,578,119
2015 Q4 17,588,576 0 68.54 1,205,520,999
2016 Q1 8,213,576 (9,375,000) 68.93 566,161,794
2016 Q2 8,213,576 0 76.10 625,053,134
Position ValuePosition Information
Sector Return 
(annualized)
Start of Quarter Shares Change
Volume Weighted 
Avgerage Price
 Beck 80 
 Appendix Q – 13D Activist Fund vs. S&P 500 Cumulative Returns 
 
 
 
 
2012 Q1 10.00 N/A N/A 1,257.60 N/A N/A N/A
2012 Q2 11.25 60.2% 60.2% 1,408.47 57.3% 57.3% 2.8%
2012 Q3 10.82 -14.4% 17.1% 1,362.16 -12.5% 17.3% -0.2%
2012 Q4 11.53 28.9% 20.9% 1,440.67 25.1% 19.9% 1.0%
2013 Q1 11.75 7.9% 17.5% 1,426.19 -4.0% 13.4% 4.1%
2013 Q2 13.59 78.9% 27.8% 1,569.19 46.6% 19.4% 8.4%
2013 Q3 13.80 6.3% 24.0% 1,606.28 9.8% 17.7% 6.2%
2013 Q4 15.19 46.8% 27.0% 1,681.55 20.1% 18.1% 8.9%
2014 Q1 15.62 11.8% 25.0% 1,848.36 46.0% 21.2% 3.7%
2014 Q2 16.38 20.9% 24.5% 1,872.34 5.3% 19.3% 5.2%
2014 Q3 17.47 29.4% 25.0% 1,960.23 20.1% 19.4% 5.6%
2014 Q4 16.83 -13.9% 20.8% 1,972.29 2.5% 17.8% 3.1%
2015 Q1 17.04 5.1% 19.4% 2,058.90 18.8% 17.9% 1.6%
2015 Q2 17.95 23.1% 19.7% 2,067.89 1.8% 16.5% 3.2%
2015 Q3 17.59 -7.8% 17.5% 2,063.11 -0.9% 15.2% 2.3%
2015 Q4 15.43 -40.8% 12.3% 1,920.03 -25.0% 11.9% 0.3%
2016 Q1 15.18 -6.3% 11.0% 2,043.94 28.4% 12.9% -1.9%
2016 Q2 15.40 5.9% 10.7% 2,059.74 3.1% 12.3% -1.6%
Cumulative Alpha 
(13D - S&P)
Start of 
Quarter
13D Activist 
Fund Price
Cumulative Return 
(annualized)
SPX Index Price
Cumulative Return 
(annualized)
Period Return 
(annualized)
Period Return 
(annualized)
